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REINVENTING THE EEOC 
Nancy M. Modesitt* 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has strug-
gled to be a meaningful force in eradicating employment discrimination 
since its inception. The primary reasons for this are structural in nature. 
The EEOC was designed to react to discrimination complaints by investi-
gating and conciliating all of the thousands of complaints filed annually. 
The EEOC has never been able to investigate all these complaints despite 
using the vast majority of its resources attempting to do so. The devotion 
of resources to managing and investigating the huge volume of complaints 
prevents the EEOC from taking more effective steps to eliminate discrimi-
nation. This article proposes a reinvention of the EEOC by making signif-
icant changes to the EEOC's organization and responsibilities. I advocate 
five fundamental changes. First, the EEOC should no longer be required 
to accept and investigate all complaints of discrimination. Instead, it 
should only investigate and litigate significant claims of discrimination. 
Second, the threat of EEOC litigation must be given greater force by al-
lowing the EEOC to collect attorneys' fees and fines from employers when 
it prevails in litigation. Third, because its mediation program has been 
quite effective, the EEOC should partner with the federal courts to provide 
mediation in employment discrimination cases filed in federal court. 
Fourth, the EEOC should increase its information-gathering and analysis 
activities to better understand and combat current trends in employment 
discrimination. Finally, the EEOC needs to expand its discrimination pre-
vention programs by providing significantly more information and training 
to employers to assist them in complying with federal laws. 
"The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and 
expecting different results. JJ 
- Albert Einstein 
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THE EEOC is an agency that has failed in its mission to eradicate discrimination in the workplace. Even if its mission is impossible, as there are those who would argue that discrimination cannot be 
completely eliminated through existing legal systems,l the EEOC has 
failed to reach its potential in reducing workplace discrimination. In the 
early years of its existence, this was primarily blamed on its lack of power 
to enforce the federal antidiscrimination laws; its roles were limited to 
investigation and conciliation.2 However, even after the EEOC obtained 
authority to enforce federal antidiscrimination laws by bringing suit 
against employers,3 the EEOC has still struggled to be a major force in 
ending workplace discrimination. 
There are several ways in which the EEOC has not fulfilled its poten-
1. See Derrick Bell, Racial Equality: Progressives' Passion for the Unattainable, 94 
VA. L. REv. 495, 517 (2008) (book review) (noting that "racial equality for blacks and 
other people of color is unattainable through law alone"). 
2. See Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why The EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOF. 
STRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 672-73, 677 (2005) (discussing the congressional recognition of 
the flaws in the initial structure of the EEOC). 
3. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 
103, 105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000». 
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tial, including making missteps in its litigation department4 and overcom-
mitting resources to manage the intake of discrimination charges.5 In 
addition, throughout much of its history, the EEOC has been hampered 
by poor management and excessive turnover in its most senior positions.6 
All these things have led to a significant credibility crisis, with the public 
lacking confidence in the EEOC's abilities.? 
Making the EEOC a force in eradicating employment discrimination 
will require more than mere tinkering. This Article proposes a complete 
restructuring of the EEOC to create an agency that focuses primarily on 
preventing discrimination and, in circumstances where prevention has 
failed, is structured to effectively enforce antidiscrimination laws. This 
Article will proceed in two parts. Part I will explain the history of the 
EEOC and the most significant reasons why the EEOC has failed to ful-
fill its potential. Part II will explain how the EEOC should be restruc-
tured, taking into account past problems with the EEOC and applying 
modern governance theories to avoid recreating structural conditions that 
have contributed to the failings of the EEOC. 
I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE EEOC 
In order to understand why the EEOC has failed in its mission and how 
it might effectively be restructured, the historical and current structure of 
the EEOC must be understood. 
A. ORIGINAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EEOC AND EARLY 
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
The EEOC was created as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 Title 
VII of the Act focused on employment discrimination and established the 
EEOC as one of the federal agencies overseeing the implementation of 
Title VIP At its outset, the EEOC lacked any enforcement authority, 
4. The most significant of these was the EEOC's decision under Clarence Thomas to 
litigate every claim that its investigators believed to be meritorious. See Michael Selmi, 
The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,14-15 (1996). The EEOC lacked the resources to litigate all such 
cases, with the result that it devoted limited resources to cases that had no significant prec-
edential value, monetary value, or even involved significant numbers of employees. Id. at 
21-22,37,64; see also Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 684. 
5. See Paul M. Igasaki, Doing the Best with What We Had: Building a More Effective 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission During the Clinton-Gore Administration, 17 
LAB. LAW. 261, 266-67 (2001) (noting that well into the 1990s, the goal of managing the 
intake and investigation of charges "took precedence over all [else]"). 
6. See infra Part I.D. 
7. See Igasaki, supra note 5, at 263-64 (noting "serious doubts" about the effective-
ness of the EEOC and a need to restore credibility to it); EEOC, FISCAL YEAR 2009 CON-
GRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 13 (2008), http://www.eeoc.gov/pian/archives/ 
budgets/2000budget/2009budget.pdf [hereinafter 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION] (2007 sur-
vey of the public found that only 47.8% of the public "had confidence in EEOC's ability to 
enforce federal equal employment [opportunity] laws"). 
8. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 241, 258 (1964) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4 (2006)). 
9. Id. at 258-59. 
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being limited in its authority to investigating and engaging in conciliation 
efforts with employers.1o The EEOC lacked the power to bring suit; this 
authority was vested in the Attorney General.n The primary focus for 
the EEOC appeared to have been the investigation and conciliation of 
employment discrimination claims,12 The EEOC was not given subpoena 
power or the power to sanction employers whom it found had engaged in 
discrimination. 13 
This complete absence of enforcement authority was partially reme-
died by the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.14 
The Act gave the EEOC the authority to bring suit on behalf of employ-
ees as well as the power to bring suit on its own when lacking an em-
ployee-plaintiff.1s Other than these significant changes,16 the EEOC's 
powers and structural responsibilities have remained substantially the 
same,17 except as to the coverage of the anti-discrimination laws. While 
its role is the same, the coverage of federal antidiscrimination laws has 
expanded, and the EEOC now handles claims not only for the original 
coverage of Title VII18 but also for age discrimination,19 disability dis-
crimination,2° and genetic discrimination claims.21 
B. INVESTIGATIVE ROLE BECOMES ALL-CONSUMING INTAKE 
UNIT ROLE 
The initial role of the EEOC was supposed to involve investigating and 
conciliating claims of employment discrimination.22 However, from the 
beginning, the primary role of the EEOC has in fact been to process 
claims (charges) of employment discrimination rather than investigate or 
10. ld. 
11. ld. § 705. 
12. This appears evident from the level of attention in the legislation devoted to the 
EEOC's role in investigation and conciliation. While the other roles of the EEOC were 
merely identified, the process of investigation and conciliation was spelled out in detail. 
Compare id. § 705, with id. §§ 700-10. 
13. See id. §§ 710, 713. 
14. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 
104-05 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5 (2006». 
15. ld. 
16. One other additional responsibility that the EEOC obtained from the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972 was the responsibility for handling federal employee 
claims of discrimination. See id. The role of the EEOC with respect to these claims is 
radically different than for claims by private-sector employees and is not the focus of this 
Article. 
17. As discussed infra Part I.E.2, the EEOC did subsequently gain responsibility for 
developing a training program, but this training program consumes a tiny amount of the 
EEOC's budget and organization in relation to the EEOC's other responsibilities. 
18. Race, sex, color, national origin, and religion. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972 § 10. 
19. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-34 (2006). 
20. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12117 (2006). 
21. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881,914. 
22. David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand On Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1121, 1135-36 (1989). 
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conciliate them.23 The reality of the EEOC as an intake and processing 
unit, rather than an investigative unit, began at its inception.24 Congress 
greatly underestimated the number of charges that the EEOC would re-
ceive; thus, it lacked adequate resources to investigate all the charges and 
quickly found itself with a huge backlog of charges,25 making effective 
investigation of the charges impossible. As a 1976 General Accounting 
Office report noted, most charges filed with the EEOC were not actually 
investigated.26 Rather than full investigation of each charge, the EEOC 
was accepting the charges but ultimately closing out nearly half of all 
charges administratively.27 Less than forty percent of all charges resulted 
in an EEOC determination as to whether discrimination had occurred.2s 
The investigations that did take place were marred by a lack of expertise 
among the investigators,29 and the agency was plagued with poor man-
agement,30 which likely contributed to the reality of the EEOC accepting 
and processing charges of discrimination rather than effectively investi-
gating them.31 
Over the decades since the establishment of the EEOC, the backlog of 
charges from private sector employees has ebbed and flowed, but has 
never been eliminated.32 This backlog of charges has continued to keep 
the EEOC in the position where it is treading water-managing the huge 
number of claims without substantively investigating them.33 In 1968, the 
average processing time for charges was sixteen months.34 By 1977, five 
years after the expansion of Title VII to cover federal, state, and local 
government employees, there was a backlog of 94,700 charges for private 
sector employees, and the average processing time for charges was thirty-
two months.35 
Against the background of a huge volume of charges and significant lag 
time between charge initiation and closure, the idea of investigating each 
charge was abandoned, and the EEOC began its first programmed efforts 
23. See Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 
35 Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 
309-310, 326 (2001). 
24. [d. at 326-27; Rose, supra note 22, at 1136-37. 
25. See Rose, supra note 22, at 1136; Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 673-75. 
26. U.S. Gov'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COM-
MISSION HAS MADE LIMITED PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 
H.R. Doc. No. 76-147, at 10-11 (1976). 
27. See id. at 10-12. 
28. [d. 
29. See Rose, supra note 22, at 1136-37; Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 673-74. 
30. See Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 674 (noting the excessive turnover at the 
highest levels of the EEOC as well as an internal memorandum from 1967 noting poor 
management). 
31. See Rose, supra note 22, at 1136-37. Another factor in preventing the EEOC from 
effectively investigating charges throughout its history has been a lack of sufficient funding. 
See Green, supra note 23, at 346-50 ("Efforts by Congress to use its power in the appoint-
ment and funding process to stymie the EEOC are well known."). 
32. See Green, supra note 23, at 310-11. 
33. [d. 
34. See Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 675. 
35. [d. at 677-78. 
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to reduce the charge backlog.36 This did in fact reduce the charge back-
log without eliminating it,37 but the backlog expanded again in the 1980s 
and 1990s,38 in part due to a reversion in the 1980s to a goal of full inves-
tigations of all charges rather than using a prioritization system to deter-
mine which charges should be given more attention.39 
By the mid-1990s, the pendulum had once again swung away from full 
investigation of all charges and toward another programmed effort to re-
duce the backlog of charges.4o It was during this time that the EEOC's 
current system developed. Since that time, charges have been categorized 
as A, B, or C as follows: A charges are those that appear to the EEOC to 
very likely indicate that the law has been violated and that indicate sys-
temic discrimination.41 B charges might involve a violation of federal an-
tidiscrimination laws but typically require more investigation.42 C 
charges clearly show a lack of merit or sometimes a lack of jurisdiction.43 
The category into which a charge is classified determines its fate.44 A 
charges receive a full investigation, with a determination of whether "rea-
sonable cause"45 exists to believe discrimination occurred.46 If reasona-
ble cause is found, then the EEOC undertakes to conciliate the matter by 
negotiating with the employer.47 If conciliation fails, then the EEOC 
may litigate the claim.48 The EEOC attempts to resolve B charges via 
mediation.49 If that resolution fails, either because the parties refuse to 
mediate or the mediation is unsuccessful, then the B charge is sent 
36. See Rose, supra note 22, at 1150. 
37. See Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 681. 
38. See End of the 1980s Leaves EEOC to Face New Challenges, EEOC, http:// 
eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1980s/end.html (last visited July 21, 2010) [hereinafter The 
1980s] (noting backlog increased in the 1980s); New Enforcement Strategies to Address Dis-
crimination in the Changing Workplace, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoclhistory/35thl1990s/ 
newenforcement.html (last visited July 21, 2010) [hereinafter The 1990s] (noting backlog 
increased in the 1990s before the charge handling policy was revised). 
39. See The 1980s, supra note 38 (noting change in charge handling policy in the 
1980s). 
40. See The 1990s, supra note 38 (noting new charge handling policy implemented to 
reduce backlog). 
41. Green, supra note 23, at 327. 
42. [d. 
43. See id. 
44. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-059, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: SHARING PROMISING PRACTICES AND FULLY IMPLEMENTING 
STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING CAN IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF GROWING WOR-
KLOAD 18 (2008) [hereinafter EEOC: PROMISING PRACTICES]' 
45. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES TO KEEP: A DECADE OF FEDERAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 171-74 (2000), http:// 
www.ncd.gov/newsroorn/publications/2000/pdflpromises.pdf. 
46. Under its National Enforcement Plan, to the extent that resources permit, the 
EEOC will investigate charges that do not involve systemic discrimination but where "it . 
appears more likely than not that discrimination has occurred." See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PLAN, VIII.A, http:// 
eeoc.gov/eeoclplan/nep.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
47. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 45, at 171-74. 
48. See id. 
49. See EEOC: PROMISING PRAcnCES, supra note 44, at 18. 
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through the A charge process.50 The charges where the EEOC deter-
mines that either it lacks jurisdiction or appear to be unsupported are 
categorized as C charges and dismissed without investigation.51 
By 2001, this program for managing charges reduced the backlog to 
approximately 32,000 charges and the processing time to just over six 
months.52 However, these gains were short-lived. Between 2004 and 
2007, the charge inventory grew again.53 In this time frame , the average 
amount of time needed to close a charge increased by 34 days-from 171 
days to 205 days.54 During fiscal year (FY) 2007, the EEOC had 127,710 
charges pending in the private sector.55 The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) found two primary reasons for the increased backlog of 
charges: (1) a decrease in the number of EEOC investigators and (2) an 
increase in the proportion of A and B charges, which are more resource 
intensive than C charges.56 While there was an increase in the number of 
mediations during this time (approximately five percent), the relative 
proportion of mediations compared to the remainder of the charges re-
mained stable. 57 In its most recent report, for FY 2008, the EEOC notes 
that one of its greatest challenges is reducing the immense inventory of 
charges, which stands at approximately 75,000.58 
The EEOC itself recognizes that what can be termed its "intake role," 
that is, its charge-handling obligations, has taken over the agency.59 In a 
recent budget justification, the section entitled "Chair's Priorities" begins 
with the statement that the "EEOC is first and foremost an enforcement 
agency responsible for accepting charges of employment discrimination 
from members of the public."60 In its Annual Report, the EEOC notes 
that charge processing is "its most important and resource-intensive activ-
ity."61 To fulfill its primary role as intake unit, the EEOC's first-listed 
priority is to hire staff to handle the growing volume of filed charges.62 
The budget numbers confirm these statements of commitment to the 
intake role. For FY 2008, the EEOC spent just over $270 million on pri-
50. See id. 
51. See id. 
52. See EEOC, COMBINED ANNUAL REPORTS FISCAL YEARS 1999-2001 (OcrOBER 1, 
1998, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2001), Private Sector Enforcement Highlights, http:// 
archive.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/annual_reports/annrep99-01.html#enforcement (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2010). 
53. See EEOC: PROMISING PRAcrICES, supra note 44, at 23. 
54. /d. at 23, 29. 
55. ld. at 24. This number includes charges filed during FY 2007, 85,509, as well as 
charges that were not closed from previous years. ld. at 24-25. 
56. ld. at 26-27. 
57. ld. at 31. 
58. See EEOC, FY 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REpORT 42 (2008), 
http://archive.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc!planlpar/2008/par2008. pdf [hereinafter 2008 REPORT]' 
59. See 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, at 3. 
60. ld. 
61. 2008 REPORT, supra note 58, at 42. 
62. 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, at 3. 
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vate sector enforcement of federal antidiscrimination laws.63 Of this $270 
million, approximately $162 million was spent on administrative charge 
processing.64 This made its intake role responsible for more than half 
(sixty percent) of its total private sector enforcement budget.65 This per-
centage of total enforcement budget has remained remarkably consistent 
in recent years.66 
Even as the EEOC devotes huge resources toward its intake role, the 
value of this service has been questionable. Professor Selmi posits that, 
in essence, the EEOC's intake role has made it an expensive and cumber-
some processer of discrimination claims, "a large number of ... [which it] 
determines have no merit."67 In addition, he argues, the EEOC's intake 
role may produce a net detriment by deterring private attorneys from 
taking some cases.68 By giving individuals the (inaccurate) perception 
that the EEOC will handle all charges of discrimination,69 the EEOC po-
tentially reduces the likelihood that the individual will obtain representa-
tion with an attorney,7o If the EEOC then issues a "no-cause" 
determination,71 the individual is left with no remedy from the EEOC 
and a claim that private attorneys may not want to pursue, with the result 
that some meritorious claims will be lost,72 
By perceiving its primary role as an intake unit and devoting a huge 
percentage of its resources to that function, the EEOC overcommits re-
sources to managing the intake of such claims,73 Processing claims does 
not reduce discrimination in the workplace. This quasi-enforcement role 
of the EEOC must be eliminated. 
C. LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF LITIGATION ROLE IN ENFORCING 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 
While the EEOC spends far too much of its resources on its role as an 
63. See EEOC, FISCAL YEAR 2010 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 12 
(2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2010budget.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION]. 
64. Id. 
65. See id. 
66. See 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, at 17 (for FY 2007, total private 
sector enforcement budget of just under $270 million; administrative charge processing 
budget of about $161 million); EEOC, FISCAL YEAR 2008 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTI-
FICATION § ILA (2007), http://archive_eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/2008budgetlindex.html#Ta-
ble2 [hereinafter 2008 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION] (for FY 2006, total private sector 
enforcement budget of nearly $268 million; administrative charge processing budget of 
about $157 million); EEOC, FY 2007 PERFORMANCE BUDGET § lILA (2006), http:// 
archive.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/2007budget/index.html#Table2 [hereinafter 2007 PER-
FORMANCE BUDGET] (for FY 2005, total private sector enforcement budget of about $265 
million; administrative charge budget of nearly $177 million). 
67. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 22, 64. 
68. Id. at 44. 
69. See id at 57. 
70. Id. at 43. 
71. Id. at 9. 
72. Id. at 43-44. 
73. See Igasaki, supra note 5, at 266-67. 
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intake unit, this is not its only responsibility.74 In addition to its powers 
of investigation and its responsibility of engaging in conciliation efforts as 
ways of reducing discrimination, the EEOC does have other enforcement 
powers.75 Unlike other federal agencies,76 the EEOC is not able to di-
rectly sanction employers who violate the federal laws it is charged with 
administering.77 Instead, the EEOC is limited to more indirect enforce-
ment efforts. Its strongest enforcement power is the EEOC's ability to 
bring suit against an employer on behalf of an individual or class of indi-
viduals.78 In addition, the EEOC uses softer techniques, such as informa-
tion gathering via the EEO-1 reports,79 as well as its investigative powers, 
to obtain evidence about violations of law that it can then seek to remedi-
ate via lawsuit or conciliation with an employer.8o While the EEOC's 
investigative power might seem significant, it is substantially limited be-
cause it can only subpoena documents when a charge of discrimination 
has been filed.81 
Because the EEOC's enforcement powers are limited,82 it is critical for 
the EEOC to effectively wield them. However, the effectiveness of the 
EEOC's use of its most obvious direct enforcement power, litigation, has 
been severely limited.83 There are three different aspects to the EEOC's 
ineffective use of litigation as an enforcement tool: (1) the litigation pro-
gram has been relatively small in scale;84 (2) there are indications that the 
EEOC's litigation program has had little impact;85 and (3) given the huge 
74. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5 (2006). 
75. See id. 
76. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, for instance, has the author-
ity to investigate and impose sanctions on employers for violating federal employee safety 
laws. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 657-658 (2006). 
77. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5. 
78. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f). 
79. The EEO-1 reports must be filed annually by all employers who have at least 100 
employees, or are a federal contractor with at least 50 employees and a contract of $50,000 
or more. The report provides information about the race, sex, and ethnicity of employees 
in each of the employer's job categories. See EEOC, ANSWERS TO EEO-1 FILING QUES-
TIONS OFTEN ASKED BY EMPLOYERS, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/ee01survey/faq.cfm 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2010). The EEOC is empowered directly by statute to require employ-
ers to provide reports to it as are "reasonable, necessary, or appropriate" to enforcing Title 
VII. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-8. 
80. See id. 
81. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 65 (1984) ("In construing the EEOC's 
authority to request judicial enforcement of its subpoenas, we must strive to give effect to 
Congress' purpose in establishing a linkage between the Commission's investigatory power 
and charges of discrimination. If the EEOC were able to insist that an employer obey a 
subpoena despite the failure of the complainant to file a valid charge, Congress' desire to 
prevent the Commission from exercising unconstrained investigative authority would be 
thwarted.") 
82. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5. 
83. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAOIT-HRD-93-30; EEOC: AN 
OVERVIEW 12 (1993) (statement of Linda G. Morra, Dir. Educ. & Emp. Issues, Human 
Resources Div.), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d45t15/149741.pdf. 
84. See 2010 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 63, at 12. 
85. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 50-51; EEOC: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 83, at 12 
(commenting that in the 1990s, the EEOC litigated less than 1 % of the charges that it 
investigated). 
1246 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
number of cases brought by private attorneys, one queries whether the 
EEOC's small litigation program makes any significant incremental dif-
ferences in promoting a discrimination-free workplace.86 
First, the EEOC's litigation program has historically been much 
smaller in scale than its intake efforts and remains so even today.87 For 
FY 2008, the litigation program received less than one-third the funding 
that the EEOC allotted to its intake role, with $162 million budgeted for 
administrative charge processing and only $57 million for its litigation 
program.88 In FY 2007, the numbers were nearly the same.89 The EEOC 
budgeted $161,259,000 for its administrative charge processing efforts and 
$56,223,000 for litigation, which gave litigation barely one-third the fund-
ing of administrative charge processing.90 
Second, the impact of the EEOC's litigation efforts has been at best 
mixed. In the early years of Title VII, the EEOC did not even have the 
authority to bring suit.91 That power lay with the Department of Justice, 
which brought several major lawsuits that resulted in significant consent 
decrees.92 And once the EEOC obtained authority to bring suit, it fo-
cused on individual claims rather than class actions or cases involving sys-
temic discrimination.93 In the years after obtaining the power to bring 
suit, the EEOC litigated only a tiny proportion of cases that it was unable 
to resolve by conciliation.94 This continued even into the 1990s, where a 
GAO report indicated that the EEOC litigated less than one percent of 
the charges that it investigated.95 In the years following the EEOC gain-
ing the power to bring suit, the EEOC initiated only one case using its 
power to bring suit directly (via a commission charge rather than relying 
on an individually filed charge).96 And the number of litigated cases has 
decreased in recent years.97 In 1989, the EEOC was involved in 599 law-
86. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 52, 64 (suggesting that a private system would be more 
effective). 
87. See EEOC: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 83, at 12 (noting that the EEOC processed 
over 68,000 claims in FY 1992 but only litigated 447); 2010 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra 
note 63, at 12 (for FY 2010, the EEOC requested about $200 million for administrative 
charge processing and only about $60 million for litigation). 
88. See 2010 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 63, at 12. 
89. See 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, at 17. 
90. See id. 
91. See Rose, supra note 22, at 1135. 
92. See id. at 1145 (discussing lawsuits involving the steel and trucking industries). 
93. See id. at 1149-1151 (noting that in the 1970s, the focus was on individual claims, 
and as of 1981, the EEOC had filed only one suit involving systemic discrimination). 
94. Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Criti-
cal Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 
60 (1977). 
95. See EEOC: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 83, at 12. 
96. Hill, supra note 94, at 61. 
97. Compare Mary Kathryn Lynch, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: 
Comments on the Agency and Its Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 20 GA. J. INT'L 
& COMPo L. 89,99 (1990), with EEOC, EEOC LmGATION STATISTICS, FY 1997 THROUGH 
FY 2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc!statistics/enforcementllitigation.cfm (last visited Sept. 
10,2010). 
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suits, either by bringing suit or intervening in the litigation.98 By 2009, 
that number had dropped to 314.99 As to adverse impact claims, no such 
claims were brought by the EEOC during the majority of the 1980s, 
which was apparently due to the political beliefs of then-Commissioner 
Clarence Thomas.1°o It was not until the 1990s that the EEOC began to 
critically examine its litigation efforts in an attempt to have a significant 
impact on discrimination and "deter discrimination beyond the litigants 
in anyone case."lOl 
Furthermore, what limited success the EEOC enjoyed in its early litiga-
tion efforts102 was devalued by notable cases where the EEOC was sanc-
tioned for its litigation efforts. In its first systemic discrimination case, 
the EEOC mismanaged the litigation by allowing an attorney with signifi-
cant ties to an outside organization (the National Organization for Wo-
men) to manage the case, to the point that the district court found that 
the EEOC's attorney had a serious conflict of interest.103 In commenting 
on the EEOC's litigation, which involved several different lawsuits filed 
against Sears, one judge stated: "This Court is impressed with Sears' con-
tention that the EEOC has engaged in a pattern of misconduct over the 
past six years which amounts to a display of general 'bad faith' on behalf 
of the EEOC sufficient to warrant dismissal of this cause. "104 
Other litigation efforts around this time also resulted in sanctions 
against the EEOC. For example, the EEOC was found to have brought a 
class action in bad faith in EEOC v. Datapoint Corp.105 and was sanc-
tioned by the court, which awarded attorneys' fees in excess of $66,000 to 
the employer.1°6 Another court, in awarding attorneys' fees to an em-
ployer, considered the EEOC's prosecution of a meritless claim so bad as 
to be "poison of bad faith."107 An EEOC attorney was fined $500 for 
filing a class action claim without an actual employee or applicant on 
whose basis the suit was brought.108 More recently, in 2010, the EEOC 
was ordered to pay almost $4.5 million in attorneys' fees to a trucking 
company it had sued on behalf of female drivers whom the EEOC 
claimed had been sexually harassed.109 The judge justified the award by 
noting that the EEOC's actions were "unreasonable" and suggested that 
98. See Lynch, supra note 97, at 99. 
99. See EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, supra note 97. 
100. See Rose, supra note 22, at 1158-59 (discussing the lack of adverse impact cases 
from 1983-89 and then-Chairman Thomas's objections to adverse impact claims). 
101. See Igasaki, supra note 5, at 262, 265-66, 268 (describing the development of a task 
force to redefine the litigation, and other, efforts of the EEOC). 
102. Former Commissioner Paul Igasaki referred to the EEOC's litigation efforts 
before the 1990s as "uneven" and being of "limited scope." Igasaki, supra note 5, at 264. 
103. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241, 249-50 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
104. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245,1253-54 (M.D. Ala. 1980). 
105. 457 F. Supp. 62, 68 (W.D. Tex. 1978). 
106. [d. at 69. 
107. EEOC v. Shoney's, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 332, 337 (N.D. Ala. 1982). 
108. EEOC v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 665 F. Supp. 197, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987). 
109. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 07-CV-95-LRR, 2010 WL 520564, at *20 
(N.D. Iowa Feb. 9, 2010). 
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the EEOC's conduct in the case was motivated by a desire to obtain me-
dia coverage.11O These types of missteps hamper the EEOC's litigation 
efforts by damaging the EEOC's reputation, creating an incentive for em-
ployees to prefer private lawyers and for employers to resist settlement 
and conciliation efforts because of the perception that the EEOC litiga-
tion may be deemed frivolous. 
Another indicia of the lack of success of the EEOC's litigation program 
is the results it achieves. Professor Selmi's detailed study of the EEOC 
conducted in the 1990s concluded that while EEOC litigation had a 
higher success rate than private litigation, it resulted in smaller awards for 
the litigants.111 Selmi also assessed the impact of the EEOC's litigation 
efforts as measured by the effect of the EEOC litigation on advancing 
and developing antidiscrimination laws in the courts and noted that the 
EEOC had rarely been a party to the major Supreme Court cases in this 
area,u2 Selmi concluded that private attorneys could effectively enforce 
anti-discrimination laws without the EEOC, with the caveat that some 
low-dollar-value cases may not be brought. H3 
The EEOC's own assessment of the effectiveness of its litigation out-
comes does not refute Selmi's findings. Its General Counsel's Office 
compared the EEOC's and private attorneys' loss rates when a case was 
decided by a court before a trial was conducted.114 The EEOC found 
that its loss rate was 5.9% as compared to 13.2% for private attorneys. 
The win rate for the EEOC at trial was 50.8% as compared to 38.3% for 
private attorneys.1 15 While the review suggests that the EEOC is achiev-
ing superior results to private attorneys, it fails to address the issue of the 
amount of recovery, which was Selmi's primary focus.1 16 Furthermore, 
the better success rate of the EEOC may be explained partially by the 
EEOC's ability to select the cases to pursue in litigation after a complete 
investigation, including obtaining information obtained directly from the 
employer.117 Such information obtained directly from the employer is 
not likely to be available to private attorneys, which negatively affects 
their ability to assess the merits of a claim before filing suit. Thus, it is to 
be expected that the EEOC would have a better success rate in litigation 
because of its ability to select only the most meritorious cases. 
Using another measure, the results of its litigation program as com-
pared to its own alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program, the 
110. [d. at *9 & n.4. 
111. Selmi, supra note 4, at 23-24 (noting that the dollar recovery for those represented 
by private litigants was higher than the EEOC-litigated cases, even when accounting for 
the costs of attorneys' fees). 
112. See id. at 24. 
113. See id. at 39. 
114. 2008 REPORT, supra note 58, at 23-24. 
115. [d. 
116. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 23-24. 
117. Under 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-9, the EEOC has the authority to obtain information 
from employers using subpoenas. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-9 (West 2010); 29 U.S.c. § 161 (West 
2010). 
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EEOC's litigation program is also not terribly effective. As compared to 
its mediation program, in terms of the dollar compensation obtained rela-
tive to cost, the EEOC's litigation program's value is far less. In FY 2007, 
the EEOC obtained over $124 million for victims of discrimination 
through its mediation program,118 which cost approximately $22 million 
to operate.119 Thus, for every dollar spent on mediation, the EEOC se-
cured over five dollars for employees, for a recovery ratio of 1:5. By con-
trast, in FY 2007, the EEOC secured approximately $55 million for 
victims of discrimination through claims resolved by the litigation pro-
gram.120 The litigation program cost $56 million to operate, giving a re-
turn of less than one dollar to employees for every dollar spent, or a 
recovery ratio of 1:1.121 
While these ratios have varied somewhat from year to year, mediation 
has been remarkably more successful in dollars spent to dollars recovered 
than litigation.122 In FY 2006, the ratio for the litigation department was 
its worst in recent years, with just under $56 million in costs123 and only 
$44 million recovered-a recovery ratio of less than 1:1,124 The media-
tion budget for that year was only $22 million,125 yet the program recov-
ered $109 million for victims of discrimination,126 for a recovery ratio of 
1:4. 
The litigation program did better in FYs 2003-2005. For FY 2005, it 
recovered $106 million127 with a budget of only $39 million,128 improving 
its recovery ratio to 1:3. In FY 2004, the budget for litigation was nearly 
$49 million129 and recovered dollars amounted to $160 million,l3° also 
within this recovery ratio of 1:3. For FY 2003, the EEOC remained in 
118. EEOC, FISCAL YEAR 2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: STRA-
TEGIC PLAN OVERVIEW (2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/ 
2007/strategic_plan.html [hereinafter 2007 REPORT]. 
119. 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, tbl.2. 
120. 2007 REpORT, supra note 118. 
121. 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, tbl.2. 
122. The numbers for FY 2006: $44 million recovered by litigation, $109 million by 
mediation. Costs for FY 2006, $21,975,000 for the mediation program, and $55,854,000 for 
litigation. See EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FY 2006: STRATE-
GIC OBJECTIVE 1 (2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeodplan/archives/annualreports/par/2006/ 
objective1.html [hereinafter 2006 REPORT] (amounts recovered); 2008 BUDGET JUSTIFICA-
TION, supra note 66, tbl.2 (cost). 
123. 2008 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 66. 
124. See 2006 REPORT, supra note 122; 2008 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 66, 
tbl.2. 
125. 2008 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 66. 
126. 2006 REPORT, supra note 122. 
127. EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FY 2005: STRATEGIC OB-
JECTIVE 1, http://www.eeoc.gov /eeodp lan/archives/ann uaJreports/par /2005/mda_ obj ective 1. 
html [hereinafter 2005 REpORT]. 
128. 2007 PERFORMANCE BUDGET, supra note 66, tbl.2. 
129. EEOC, FY 2006 PERFORMANCE BUDGET tbl.2 (2005), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
plan/archiveslbudgets/2006budgetlindex.html [hereinafter 2006 PERFORMANCE BUDGET]. 
130. EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REpORT FY 2004: STRATEGIC OB-
JECTIVE 1 (2004), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeodplan/archives/annualreports/par/2004/mda_ob-
jective1.html [hereinafter 2004 REPORT]. 
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this range, with a recovery of $149 million131 and a budget of just over 
$55 millionP2 During this same time frame, FYs 2003-2005, the media-
tion program always exceeded the recovery ratio of the litigation pro-
gram, with ratios ranging from a high of 1:7 in FY 2005133 to a low of 1:5 
in FY 2003.134 
This is not to say that the EEOC's litigation program has been a com-
plete failure. Indeed, it has enjoyed some notable successes, even amidst 
some of the more embarrassing failures of the early years. For instance, 
EEOC litigation resulted in bringing the entire steel industry under a 
consent decree to achieve racial desegregationPS Much more recently, 
the EEOC obtained a consent decree with Walgreens to eliminate racial 
discrimination in its retail management and pharmacy jobs.136 And in 
2008, the EEOC announced a $27 million consent decree entered into 
with Sidley Austin, a large law firm, to resolve systemic age discrimina-
tion against partners in the firmP7 However, the EEOC has not had any 
industry-wide successes in recent yearsP8 
D. MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS 
Undoubtedly, there have been times when the EEOC has not suffered 
from poor management. However, it is clear that throughout its exis-
tence, the EEOC has been hampered in its effectiveness by management 
issues. In the early years of its existence, there was significant turnover at 
the highest levels of the EEOC, contributing to a lack of effective man-
agement.139 In 1998 and in 2010, the EEOC experienced problems with 
filling its most senior positions; the EEOC has twice nearly lost its ability 
to conduct official business because it lacked sufficient commissioners to 
131. EEOC, FY 2003 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2003), http:// 
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/2003/ [hereinafter 2003 REPORT]' 
132. EEOC, FY 2005 PERFORMANCE BUDGET tbl.2 (2004), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
plan/archives/budgets/2005budget.html [hereinafter 2005 PERFORMANCE BUDGET]. 
133. For FY 2005, the EEOC mediation program recovered $115 million for victims of 
discrimination at a cost of just over $16 million. See 2005 REPORT, supra note 127; 2007 
PERFORMANCE BUDGEt, supra note 66, tbl.2 (cost). 
134. For FY 2003, the EEOC's mediation program recovered $116 million at a cost of 
$22 million. See 2005 PERFORMANCE BUDGET, supra note 132, tbl.2 (cost); 2003 REpORT, 
supra note 131 (amount recovered). The EEOC's performance in FY 2004 was closer to 
FY 2003 than FY 2005, with $112 million recovered at a cost 0 nearly $20 million. See 2006 
PERFORMANCE BUDGET, supra note 129, tbl.2 (cost); 2004 REpORT, supra note 130 
(amount recovered). 
135. See Casey Ichniowski, Have Angels Done More? The Steel Industry Consent De-
cree, 36 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 182 (1983) (describing the decree, events leading to it, 
and effect of the decree). 
136. 2007 REPORT, supra note 118. 
137. 2008 REPORT, supra note 58. 
138. The EEOC reports annually to Congress on its programmatic successes. In none 
of its recent reports has it mentioned any industry-wide efforts. See 2008 REPORT, supra 
note 58; 2007 REpORT, supra note 118; 2006 REpORT, supra note 122; 2005 REpORT, supra 
note 127, app. B; 2004 REpORT, supra note 130; 2003 REPORT, supra note 131. 
139. Hill, supra note 94, at 74-75. 
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do SO.140 Another factor leading to management problems early in the 
EEOC's existence was the lack of specific responsibilities for the commis-
sioners themselves and, potentially caused by this, significant personal 
fighting among commissioners during meetings.141 High staff turnover 
was a problem within the agency.142 In addition, during these early years 
there were allegations of significant financial mismanagement and im-
proper handling of discrimination charges, including improper closures of 
charges, in the EEOC's district offices.143 
GAO reports from the 1970s to 2006 articulate significant management 
problems. In the late 1970s, financial mismanagement was so atrocious 
that Congress called upon the GAO to investigate the EEOC, and the 
GAO issued a scathing report noting numerous accounting and possibly 
criminal violations. l44 The Acting Chairman of the EEOC acknowledged 
the serious financial mismanagement.145 In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the GAO noted that there were indications that the EEOC investi-
gators were not actually investigating claims that they should have inves-
tigated.146 Instead, they were issuing "no cause" determinations in order 
to close more files and improve their performance rating.147 More re-
cently, in a 2005 report, the EEOC itself informed the GAO that it could 
not comply with certain mandatory self-assessments in part because of 
"management challenges. "148 
Focusing on its most resource-intensive role, the intake unit, a 2008 
GAO report noted management failures as indicated by certain key data. 
Specifically, the EEOC lacked systemic processes to identify effective 
management of the workload of investigators,149 who comprise between 
one-fourth and one-third of the EEOC's total workforce.150 The GAO 
140. See Reginald E. Jones, Are We Witnessing a Kinder, Gentler EEOC? The EEOC's 
Task Force Report on Best Private Sector EEO and Diversity Practices and Other Agency 
Trends, 14 LAB. LAW. 317, 318-20 (1998) (discussing the lack of sufficient commissioners in 
1998); Kevin McGowan, EEOC Seeks to Rebuild Internally While Awaiting New Agency 
Leadership, 10 DAILY LAB. REP (BNA) S-33 (Jan. 19, 2010) (describing situation in 2010). 
141. See Hill, supra note 94, at 75, 77. 
142. [d. at 75. 
143. [d. at 79. 
144. See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-82-72, CONTIN-
UING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AT THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION (1982), available at http://archive.gao.gov/fOl02/118663.pdf. 
145. Id. app. I. 
146. EEOC: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 83, at 9. 
147. See EEOC: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 83, at 12 (referencing the high rate of "no 
cause" determinations and noting that a 1988 report concluded that part of the reason for 
the high rate was improper closure of files). 
148. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-10, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR· 
TUNITY COMMISSION: ACTIONS TAKEN, BUT AGENCY RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS COULD 
BENEFIT FROM A MORE SYSTEMATIC CONSIDERATION OF ADVISORY PANEL'S RECOMMEN· 
DATIONS 3 (2005). 
149. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-589, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP· 
PORTUNITY COMMISSION: SHARING PROMISING PRACTICES AND FULLY IMPLEMENTING 
STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING CAN IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF GROWING WOR· 
KLOAD 37 (2008). 
150. See id. at 27 (noting total number of non-supervisory investigators between 
2004-2008); see also id. at 1 (noting the total number of personnel at the EEOC in 2008). 
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found that there was no correlation between workload of investigators 
and their ability to close charges in a timely manner.151 Another manage-
ment failure was the EEOC's inability to complete a human capital plan 
for more than four years after it was initially required.152 A third manage-
ment problem was at the highest levels. According to senior officials, the 
full Commission failed to take action in a timely manner to approve (or 
reject) funding for any commitment of funds in excess of $100,000, which, 
among other things, delayed efforts on the human capital plan.153 These 
management failures have contributed to the EEOC's ineffectiveness. 
Furthermore, they are indicative of the need for a complete overhaul of 
the agency. Making a few changes will not change the culture of the 
agency. A complete restructuring is needed to revitalize management. 
E. LIMITED ROLE IN PROACfIVEL Y PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION 
The primary focus of the EEOC, as discussed above, is on responding 
to discrimination in the workplace by administratively processing charges 
of discrimination, investigating them, and litigating them. These are reac-
tive programs in the sense that they respond to claims of discrimination 
and attempt to remedy those situations. The theory is that this reactive 
role deters subsequent discrimination. That is not the complete extent of 
the EEOC's work, however. The EEOC also has some programs de-
signed to proactively prevent (and eliminate) discrimination in the work-
place. There are two types of these programs: non-fee-based programs 
and fee-based programs. Both these programs are quite modest in scale 
and, as a result, have little hope of significantly decreasing discrimination 
in the workplace. 
1. General Outreach Efforts: Non-Fee Programs 
The original text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not 
focus much attention on outreach and educational assistance by the 
EEOC. However, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress attempted to 
make this more of a priority for the EEOC.154 As to victims of discrimi-
nation, the EEOC was encouraged to engage in outreach, including out-
reach to non-English speakers.155 As to employers, the Act provided the 
EEOC with the power "to furnish to persons subject to this subchapter 
such technical assistance as they may request to further their compliance 
with this subchapter or an order issued thereunder."156 
In keeping with these statutory mandates, the EEOC has undertaken 
some outreach and educational effortsI57 as well as some initiatives de-
151. [d. at 34. 
152. [d. at 39. 
153. [d. at 42. 
154. See 42 V.S.c. §2000e-4(h)(1) (West 2010). 
155. See id. § 2000e-4(h)(2). 
156. [d. § 2000e-4(g)(3). 
157. One recent outreach effort was focused on educating Arabs and Muslims about 
employment discrimination after September 11, 2001. See News Release, EEOC, EEOC 
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signed to decrease employment discrimination.158 The primary outreach 
and educational efforts appear to be focused on providing information to 
employers and employees. As the EEOC's website states: "EEOC's out-
reach programs provide general information about the EEOC, its mis-
sion, the employment discrimination laws enforced by EEOC and the 
charge and complaint process."159 The "general information" referenced 
appears to be any information available on the website,160 which in-
cludesI6I an overview of the federal anti-discrimination laws,162 an expla-
nation of the types of employer actions that constitute unlawful 
discrimination,163 and an overview of complaint filing and processing 
procedures.164 
The EEOC also undertakes hands-on outreach. For instance, in Hous-
ton, Texas, the EEOC has worked with nongovernmental entities to get 
information to Hispanic workers about federal antidiscrimination laws.165 
There have also been periodic initiatives undertaken by the EEOC di-
rected at raising awareness of some potential victims of discrimination, 
such as the EEOC's Youth@Work initiativeI66 and its E-Race 
initiative.167 
In addition to providing information that appears primarily directed to 
potential victims of discrimination so that they understand their rights,168 
the EEOC also provides assistance to employers to comply with the laws. 
to Receive 'Friend in Government' Award from American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee, 2004 WL 2212953, at *1-2 (Oct. 1,2004) (discussing outreach program). 
158. An ongoing initiative is the EEOC's E-Race initiative, which is focused on reduc-
ing the most common type of discrimination (race-based). See E-RACE Goals and Initia-
tives, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/goals.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 
2010). 
159. See No-Cost Outreach Programs, EEOC, http://archive.eeoc.gov/outreach! 
nocost.html (last modified Mar. 4, 2009). 
160. The EEOC also conducts in-person outreach, sometimes working with other enti-
ties such as nonprofits. See Shannon Gleeson, From Rights to Claims: The Role of Civil 
Society in Making Rights Real for Vulnerable Workers, 43 LAW & SOC'y REV. 669, 673-74, 
692 (2009) (describing outreach efforts). 
161. The website also includes more technical legal information such as the text of fed-
eral anti-discrimination laws and regulations, as well as the EEOC's legal guidance and 
compliance manual, all of which appear to be directed primarily at lawyers rather than 
laypersons. See Laws, Regulations and Policy Guidance, EEOC, http://archive.eeoc.gov/ 
policy/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
162. See Federal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Laws, EEOC, http:// 
archive.eeoc.gov/abouteeo/overview_laws.html (last modified Apr. 20, 2004). 
163. See Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/laws/prac-
ticesl (last visited Oct. 25, 2010); Discrimination by Type, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/laws/types 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
164. See Filing a Charge, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/factslllowtofil.html(last modified June 
10, 1997). 
165. See Gleeson, supra note 160, at 692. 
166. Naomi C. Earp, Forty-Three and Counting: EEOC's Challenges and Successes and 
Emerging Trends in the Employment Arena, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 145-46 
(2007) (describing Youth@Work initiative). 
167. See E-RACE Goals and Initiatives, supra note 158 (describing outreach efforts to 
potential victims of race discrimination). 
168. For example, the EEOC initiative undertaken post-9/ll to address discrimination 
against Arabs and Muslims appears primarily directed at outreach efforts to potential vic-
tims of discrimination. See News Release, EEOC, supra note 157 (identifying numerous 
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One of the sections of the EEOC's website focuses solely on employ-
ers.169 It includes information about employer obligations under antidis-
crimination lawsI70 and what to expect when a charge of discrimination is 
filed.17I 
The EEOC's website is not the only means by which the EEOC pro-
vides information to employers and employees. EEOC personnel also 
speak at panel presentations as well as other events and conferences, pro-
viding information in those contexts.ln However, unless it is charging a 
fee, the EEOC does little in terms of education and outreach to employ-
ers beyond providing information and designating a person in each field 
office to be a liaison to small businesses.173 
2. Fee-Based Programs 
As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the EEOC was also directed to 
create a technical assistance and training institute to assist employers in 
complying with the federal antidiscrimination laws.174 In 1992, the insti-
tute became fee-based when Congress passed the EEOC Education, 
Technical Assistance, and Training Revolving Fund ACt.175 This law ex-
plicitly required that fees be charged for training, education, and techni-
cal assistance provided to employers and that the fees bear a "reasonable 
relationship" to the costs of the assistance provided.176 It funded the in-
stitute with $1 million initially, to be placed in a revolving fund that 
would be replenished out of the fees charged to users.177 Pursuant to this 
legislative mandate, the EEOC created its "Training Institute."178 The 
Training Institute conducts seminars and conferences and also does in-
house training at an employer's business location.179 
The Training Institute has not been without problems, however. A per-
formance audit performed in FY 2007 found numerous deficiencies, in-
cluding a lack of vision for the future of the program, failure to keep pace 
outreach efforts aimed at educating victims of discrimination but only once mentioning 
providing assistance to employers in preventing it). 
169. See Employers, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/employers/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
170. See 2010 EEO-1 Survey, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/ (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2010) (explaining the annual filing requirements for large employers and 
federal contractors). 
171. See EEOC Investigations-What an Employer Should Know, EEOC, http:// 
archive.eeoc.gov/employers/investigations.html (last modified Mar. 3, 2003). 
172. For instance, the EEOC recently held a public hearing in D.C. regarding age dis-
crimination during the current economic downturn. See Steve Vogel, Age Discrimination 
Claims Jump, Worrying EEOC, Worker Advocates, WASH. POST, July 16, 2009, at A21. 
173. See Small Business Liaisons, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/employers/contacts.cfm (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
174. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4U) (West 2010). 
175. Pub. L. No. 102-411, 106 Stat. 2102 (1992). 
176. Id. § 2(A)(iii). 
177. Id. §§ 2(A), 4. 
178. The Training Institute has its own website. See EEOC TRAINING INSTITUTE, http:// 
www.eeotraining.eeoc.gov/viewpage.aspx?ID=030b9cb8-8e56-433c-a410-cc94ccb64b3a 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
179. The current offerings are available at the Training Institute website. See id. 
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with technological changes, and funding problems.180 The size of the 
Training Institute is also very small; it has only eight full-time staff.181 
The EEOC's full-time equivalent (FIE) personnel for FY 2007 were 
2,157,182 which indicates the relative lack of importance of this aspect of 
the EEOC's operations. The Training Institute's budget is likewise minis-
cule compared to the EEOC's total budget, with the Training Institute's 
total costs for FY 2007 at less than $1 million,183 while the EEOC's total 
budget stood at over $328 million.184 With a tiny budget, an inadequate 
staff, and a lack of vision, the effectiveness of this training and educa-
tional program is questionable at best. 
F. PUTTING IT TOGETHER: A TIME FOR CHANGES 
These numerous failings make the EEOC an agency ripe for reinven-
tion. Making changes in the manner in which the EEOC operates, rather 
than significant structural changes, has been tried and has shown little 
evidence of success. For instance, in 2001, the agency was required to 
submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) its internal 
workforce analysis and plans to restructure the agency to make it more 
effective and efficient.18s The EEOC failed to submit its restructuring 
plan on time and eventually brought in outside consultants to create 
one.186 Even with this outside assistance, it failed to submit the required 
plan.187 Ultimately, it decided to streamline some operations by closing 
some offices and outsourcing some call center operations.188 However, 
the EEOC never created a complete restructuring plan, and, as late as 
2005, it failed to submit any plans to reorganize its headquarters.189 The 
GAO report outlining both the situation and the EEOC's numerous fail-
ings illustrates the incredible difficulties of changing the EEOC through 
incremental means guided by the Agency itself.190 
However, the current administration appears to be willing to embrace 
new ideas and has appointed those with significant knowledge of the the-
ory of administrative law within the administration.191 And perhaps most 
180. EEOC, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COM-
MISSION'S EDUCATION, TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REVOLVING 
FUND FY 2007, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/oiglaudiCrevolvefund.cfm 
[hereinafter 2007 PERFORMANCE AUDIT] (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
181. [d. 
182. 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, tbl.1. 
183. See 2007 PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 180. 
184. 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, tbl.1. 
185. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 1, 29 (describing the 
OMB requirements). 
186. See id. at 14. 
187. [d. 
188. See id. at 17. 
189. See id. at 18, 27. 
190. See generally id. 
191. See Jonathan Weisman & Jess Bravin, Obama's Regulatory Czar Likely to Set a 
New Tone, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2009, at A4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12 
3138051682263203.html (commenting on the selection of Cass Sun stein to head the White 
House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs). 
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importantly, the EEOC is in the midst of experiencing epic turnover. A 
2008 GAO report indicates that by 2012, all of the EEOC's senior execu-
tives and managers "will be retirement eligible," if not having already 
retired. l92 The EEOC is currently in the process of hiring a significant 
number of new employees as the current administration has increased its 
budget significantly.193 And the EEOC has had two new Commission 
positions filled in 2010.194 This provides an opportunity to use the whole-
sale replacement of employees and managers as a means of changing the 
management culture and bringing in managers who embrace a new, 
reinvented EEOC. 
II. REINVENTING THE EEOC: LEARNING FROM THE PAST 
AND USING MODERN GOVERNANCE THEORIES TO 
GUIDE THE RESTRUCTURING 
There are five specific ways in which the EEOC should be restructured: 
(1) the EEOC should no longer be statutorily required to accept, investi-
gate, and conciliate all charges of discrimination and should instead 
devote resources only to significant claims; (2) the EEOC should be au-
thorized through Title VII amendment to conduct investigations of em-
ployer practices, to allow the EEOC to recover attorneys' fees when it 
prevails in litigation, and to impose fines on employers in cases where the 
EEOC prevails in litigation; (3) the EEOC should be statutorily author-
ized to develop a partnership with the federal courts under which the 
EEOC would provide mediation services to litigants in employment dis-
crimination claims; (4) the EEOC should increase its information-gather-
ing and analysis activities to better identify trends in employment 
discrimination and address those trends; and (5) the EEOC should 
devote significantly greater resources to assisting employers with compli-
ance by providing information and conducting training. 
These proposals were developed with the goal of creating an optimal 
federal antidiscrimination agency. For each proposal, I analyze where the 
EEOC has failed and explain how the proposal avoids these pitfalls. The 
proposals were also developed in consideration of modern regulatory the-
ories; for each proposal, relevant theoretical justifications are also as-
sessed. In order to understand the regulatory theory involved, a brief 
overview is necessary. 
192. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 149, at 1. 
193. McGowan, supra note 140, at 1 (noting the need to hire more than 100 new em-
ployees in 2010). 
194. Press Release, U.S. EEOC, Chai Feldblum Sworn in as a Commissioner of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
newsroomlrelease/4-7-lOa.cfm (noting that Jacqueline Berrien was sworn in as Chair of the 
Commission, and Chai Feldblum as a commissioner, on April 7, 2010). 
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A. MODERN THEORIES OF EFFECTIVE AGENCIES: GOVERNANCE, NOT 
TRADITIONAL REGULATION 
There are a number of scholars who have critiqued the traditional regu-
latory model for having structural failures195 that have contributed to the 
failure to achieve agency goals. 196 These structural failings include exces-
sive centralization, which creates a one-size-fits-all approach that may not 
be effective in all situations and locations.197 Another structural flaw is 
the difficulty of cross-agency cooperation in an era of multiple potential 
regulators.198 A third is the failure of agencies to consider the economic 
impact of their oversight on those affected.199 Areas where failure has 
been identified most commonly include the environmental regulatory 
area.200 Failure of the regulatory process in the workplace has also been 
addressed by scholars; however, they primarily focus on safety and health 
issues rather than antidiscrimination laws.201 
The flaws with the traditional regulatory model have led to a variety of 
suggested changes. While critiques of the traditional regulatory model 
are widespread and have been present for decades, suggested improve-
ments have often merely tinkered with the system, adding features such 
as consideration of costs and benefits of reguiation202 or the interests of 
all parties directly regulated by the agency.203 At times, critique has led 
195. This is to be distinguished from situational failures of the regulatory process such 
as a flawed decision by a particular agency not to impose sanctions on a particular entity 
that is violating the law, or a decision by the legislature not to regulate in a particular area 
of law at all. 
196. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1,3-5 (1997); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the 
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 344 (2004); 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1805 (1975). 
197. See Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86, 99-100 (1986). 
198. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, A Poisoned Field: Farmworkers, Pesticide Expo-
sure, and Tort Recovery in an Era of Regulatory Failure, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 431, 451-53 (2004) (discussing the failure of effective regulation of pesticide ex-
posure for farm workers). 
199. See Robert W. Hahn et aI., Empirical Analysis: Assessing Regulatory Impact Anal-
yses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866,23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'y 859, 860-61, 863 (2000) (noting the failure of agencies to conduct effective cost-
benefit analyses even when they have annual costs of more than $100,000,000). 
200. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: Designing 
Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 21 L. & POL'y 49, 50 (1999) (discussing the 
failures of regulation of environmental protection on a national and international level); 
Richard B. Stewart, The Future of Environmental Regulation: United States Environmental 
Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 585, 587 (1996). 
201. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, The Failed Promise of Workplace Health Regulation, 
111 W. VA. L. REV. 15, 18 (2008). But see Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the 
Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 329-30, 335-36 (2005) 
(discussing the failures of regulation as to a variety of aspects of the workplace, including 
preventing discrimination, promoting a safe workplace, and ensuring compliance with 
wage-hour laws). 
202. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGU· 
LATORY PROTECTION 3-5, 8 (2002); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Econom-
ics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 341-42 (1988). 
203. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 197, at 102. 
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to deregulation in a particular area, such as with airline deregulation.204 
However, a wholesale reconsideration of the administrative system has 
also been suggested, with many scholars concluding that the administra-
tive branch of government should be moving toward a governance model 
and away from a traditional regulatory model.205 While it is impossible to 
effectively explain governance theories in only a few pages, an overview 
of some of the ideas generated by these theorists will provide a founda-
tion for the application of governance theories that underlie the proposed 
changes to the EEOC. 
In one of the early explorations of a wholesale change of the regulatory 
system, Ian Ayres and Jon Braithwaite advocated moving from traditional 
regulation to what they termed "responsive regulation."206 Responsive 
regulation contains several key features. 207 First, Ayres and Braithwaite 
argue that agencies need "big sticks"; that is, significant power to punish 
bad behavior.208 This power to reactively punish should not be the pri-
mary focus of an agency; instead, the focus should be on preventing un-
wanted behavior and persuading corporate actors to engage in desirable 
behavior.209 As the authors state: "[t]he trick of successful regulation is 
to establish a synergy between punishment and persuasion," neither ap-
proach being fully successful on its own.210 Using a punishment approach 
will undermine voluntary self-compliance in some circumstances, while 
some entities will not comply unless the costs of noncompliance are suffi-
cient.211 Thus, they articulate what is termed "TFT," short for "tit-for-
tat," under which regulators assume voluntary compliance until faced 
with violations.212 A second component to their concept of responsive 
regulation is the enforcement pyramid.213 Regulators start with the least-
punitive approach, that is, persuasion, and then escalate the response to 
violations bit-by-bit until the regulated entity complies.214 Drawing heav-
ily on economic and game theory as well as sociological research, their 
vision is of a regulator who begins with a presumption of trust and uses 
204. See Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation and the Public 
Interest,44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179,179-80 (1981). Some of the suggested changes 
to the traditional model devolve from purely political positions, as with the generalized 
Republican push for deregulation. See Lobel, supra note 196, at 354. This is not what I 
mean by a more modern approach to regulation. 
205. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 196, at 4; Lobel, supra note 196, at 344. 
206. IAN AYRES & JON BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 3-4 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992). 
207. See id. at 5-6. 
208. See id. at 19. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 25. Ayres & Braithwaite use game theory and sociological research to sup-
port this approach. Id. The fundamental idea is that at times, individuals are motivated by 
rational self-interest, by which legal compliance is secured best by deterring bad behavior 
(punishment model), while at other times, individuals are motivated by other factors such 
as a desire to do the "right thing," by which legal compliance is best secured using volun-
tary approaches. See id. at 20, 22, 24-25. 
211. See generally id. at 19-53. 
212. Id. at 19, 21-22. 
213. /d. at 20. 
214. Id. at 35. 
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the fear of substantial punishments, not minor fines, to cajole compliance 
on an individual level and to create a culture of compliance on an indus-
try level. 215 
Furthermore, Ayres and Braithwaite advocate for a tripartite structure 
of regulation, giving private interest groups an active role in regulation to 
act as guardians against agency capture and to assist in ensuring that the 
interests of the public are not 10S1.216 Another key aspect to their model 
involves enforced self-regulation by companies, where companies create 
the applicable rules, the agency approves the rules, and then the agency 
has oversight authority focusing on ensuring that the compliance group 
within the company is functioning effectively and, if not, the agency sanc-
tions the company.217 
Jody Freeman subsequently articulated a somewhat similar model of 
administration, calling it collaborative governance.218 Freeman's model 
"views the administrative process as a problem-solving exercise in which 
parties share responsibility for all stages of the rule-making process, in 
which solutions are provisional, and in which the state plays an active, if 
varied, role."219 There are five key features of Freeman's model:220 (1) a 
"problem-solving orientation" of the agency, using collaboration and 
face-to-face discussions to achieve quality solutions;221 (2) broad partici-
pation in the administrative process, both in formulating questions and 
identifying problems as well as in suggesting appropriate action and reso-
lutions;222 (3) provisional solutions and a commitment to revisiting issues 
in light of the changing societal context and scientific developments;223 
(4) oversight functions located in entities other than the agency itself, in-
cluding non-traditional arrangements such as self- and third-party moni-
toring;224 and (5) flexible agency roles such as facilitator of multi-party 
negotiations to resolve problems, information provider, and consensus 
builder, in addition to the traditional role of enforcer.225 
As is evident from quick comparison of the features of responsive regu-
lation and collaborative governance, they share certain core ideas. Rec-
ognizing these similarities, as well as drawing on the works of other 
scholars in this field, Orly Lobel recently synthesized the works of these 
scholars into .a new governance model that shifts the core concepts of 
regulation in the following ways.226 First, rather than relying on experts 
to make top-down decisions, the governance model is participatory and 
215. See generally id. at 50-53. 
216. See id. at 54-60. 
217. Id. at 106-07. 
218. Freeman, supra note 196, at 4-6. 
219. Id. at 6. 
220. See id. at 22. 
221. Id. at 22-27. 
222. Id. at 22, 27-28. 
223. Id. at 22, 28-29. 
224. Id. at 22, 30--31. 
225. Id. at 22, 31-33. 
226. See Lobel, supra note 196, at 344. 
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collaborative in nature.227 For example, instead of experts deciding on the 
substantive law and then delivering services, affected parties have a sig-
nificant voice in determining substance as part of an ongoing dialogue 
with the agency.228 Third-party agents, including private sector and non-
profit entities, can be involved in the delivery of governmental ser-
vices.229 Second, in lieu of a uniform approach, the governance model 
embraces a multiplicity of approaches; it recognizes that not all situations 
are alike and that diversity is helpful in achieving the administrative 
agency's goals.230 Third, governance promotes decentralization of deci-
sion-making and provision of services at the locality level rather than by a 
centralized authority.231 Fourth, the regulatory view of separate domains 
involving discrete areas of law is replaced by a holistic, broader perspec-
tive, encouraging consideration of related fields of authority and law to 
better determine appropriate action.232 Fifth, governance models stress 
flexibility of approach and the use of noncoercive tactics (so-called "soft 
law") rather than relying solely on government enforcement standards or 
rules.233 Sixth, the governance model replaces ideas of infallibility and 
inflexibility of regulatory regimes with their opposites, celebrating 
change, responsiveness to change, and a recognition that trial and error is 
inevitable, especially given constant social change.234 Seventh, in order 
to prevent problems potentially caused by deregulation and decentraliza-
tion, the governance model adds the concept of orchestration; that is, one 
of the roles of an administrative agency is to coordinate efforts at the 
local, state, and national levels to ensure coherence and find the appro-
priate level (local, state, or national) at which decisions should be 
made.235 Not all these ideas are relevant to the EEOC. However, at 
least one governance concept supports each of the following proposals. 
B. EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO 
THE EEOC 
1. Proposal One: Eliminating Charge Investigation and Focusing on 
Significant Litigation 
First, as others have articulated before me, the EEOC's charge-
processing obligations need to be eliminated.236 This will allow the 
227. [d. 
228. [d. at 378. 
229. [d. at 374-75. Lobel discusses participatory and collaborative features separately. 
See id. at 348. I find them so intertwined that they are more readily understood together. 
230. /d. at 379-81. 
231. [d. at 381. 
232. [d. at 385-86. 
233. [d. at 388-89. 
234. [d. at 395-96. 
235. [d. at 400. 
236. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 3 (suggesting that the EEOC's charge-processing func-
tions are an expensive way of screening out non-viable claims and that they should be 
eliminated); Green, supra note 23, at 311-14 (advocating the use of mandatory mediation 
as a potential solution to the problem of insufficient resources to investigate and resolve 
charges effectively). 
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agency to focus its limited resources237 on more effective techniques of 
combating and eliminating discrimination. Claims by employees of dis-
crimination should be treated as other federal civil rights claims are and 
should be brought in federal courts without first mandating the EEOC 
administrative process. 
This elimination of an incredibly expensive function is the foundation 
of all that follows. The elimination of the administrative charge-process-
ing role is justified because of all the problems with it identified in Sec-
tion LA above: it is costly and has never been and cannot be done 
effectively. From a pragmatic perspective, the EEOC does not need to 
investigate all claims of discrimination any longer. In the wake of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, with the allowance of compensatory damages 
and jury trials,238 the increased incentives for private attorneys to under-
take the cause of investigating and representing victims of discrimination 
suggest that the EEOC's efforts are not needed in many cases.239 As 
Professor Selmi found in his research, private attorneys appear to do a 
better job recovering damages for their clients than do EEOC attor-
neys.240 In addition, there are non-profit entities that also represent vic-
tims who may not have access to an attorney.241 In short, there is no real 
need for the EEOC to attempt to investigate all the individual claims that 
involve settled issues of law-these can be handled by other groups in 
society. Furthermore, the ability and need for the EEOC to act as an 
investigator in all cases is questionable at best. The agency itself recog-
nizes this in its systemic tracking system under which some charges filed 
with it will not be investigated at all.242 
Modern governance models support the goal of investigating and liti-
gating only significant claims. Specifically, leaving enforcement in the 
237. The EEOC has never been funded at a level that would allow full investigation of 
all charges filed with it. See Kathryn Moss et aI., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study 
of the Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, SO U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 104 (2001) (noting that "[t)he history of 
the EEOC ... can be seen as a series of attempts to deal with the inescapable fact that the 
Agency lacked the resources to do the job it had been assigned to do"). 
238. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(a)(1), (c)(1) (2006). 
239. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 3-4. 
240. See id. at 23. 
241. There are numerous legal aid organizations that provide assistance with claims of 
employment discrimination. See, e.g., Employment Law Project, THE LEGAL AID SOCI· 
ETY, http://www.legal-aid.orglen/civil/civilpractice/employmen tlawproject.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2010) (describing the New York Legal Aid Society's Employment Law Project, 
which provides assistance on employment issues including discrimination claims); About, 
THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY-EMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER, http://www.las-eIc.orglabout.html 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (describing the San Francisco area Legal Aid Society's Employ-
ment Law Center, which provides counseling on employment discrimination as well as 
conducting employment discrimination litigation); Free & Low Cost Legal Services in Utah, 
"AND JUSTICE FOR ALL" (2008), http://andjusticeforall.org/Legal%20Aid%20Resource 
%20Guide.pdf (describing available legal aid in Utah, including the Utah Legal Services, 
which provides representation and counseling in the area of employment discrimination); 
About Us, LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF ROANOKE VALLEY, http://lasrv.orglAboutUs.cfm?page 
name=AboutUs (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (describing the Roanoke Legal Aid Society's 
mission, which includes representing individuals in employment discrimination cases). 
242. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
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hands of private parties is consistent with the governance concept of de-
volving government involvement to the entities best equipped to handle 
it and, where enforcement is effective in private hands, leaving it there.243 
In this situation, much of Title VII enforcement is at least as effective in 
the hands of private attorneys as it is with the EEOC. 
In addition to the practical impossibility of investigating all charges and 
the growth of private attorney representation, which indicates a de-
creased need for EEOC investigation, governance theory suggests that by 
focusing attention, even if limited, on all claims, the EEOC hampers its 
mission. This occurs because those who are regulated, employers, per-
ceive the agency as nit-picking when it uses resources to address all com-
plaints of discrimination.244 As a result, employers lose respect for the 
agency and are less inclined to comply with the agency. 
An example of a situation that would lead to employer disgruntlement 
with the EEOC may help illustrate the problem. Assume an employee 
claims a co-worker does not like him because of his religion. The co-
worker has never expressed by words or actions anything about the em-
ployee's religion, but the employee is convinced that the co-worker is 
harboring ill will. The co-worker has no authority over the employee and 
has no say in the employee's job responsibilities. The co-worker is admit-
tedly antisocial. He does not talk to people at work other than to re-
spond to work-related questions. The employee is convinced that this 
unwillingness to socialize with co-workers is, when directed at him, be-
cause of religion, even though the co-worker is universally antisocial. The 
employee files a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC 
must accept the charge. Even if the EEOC ultimately decides that there 
is no basis for the charge, it must devote sufficient attention to it to make 
this determination. The employer is aware of the charge and that it is 
pending with the EEOC. In the eyes of the employer, any attention by 
the EEOC to this charge is too much attention-why is it, thinks the em-
ployer, that the EEOC is not focusing on meritorious claims? 
The EEOC needs the authority to decide which claims to accept and 
which ones to allow private attorneys to handle. At present, it has to 
accept them all, contributing to the employer perception that the EEOC 
wastes employers' time and that it is insignificant to have an EEOC 
charge pending. This perception detracts from the EEOC's ability to cre-
ate a meaningful system of preventing or remediating discrimination.245 
From the employee's perspective, the EEOC's current structure and 
practice may mislead the employee by appearing to promise an investiga-
243. See Freeman, supra note 196, at 30-3l. 
244. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 206, at 50-53. 
245. The EEOC itself has recognized the need to focus greater resources outside of its 
intake role. When it adopted its National Enforcement Plan, it identified a three-pronged 
approach to eliminating discrimination. The first prong identified was engaging in educa-
tion and outreach. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NATIONAL 
ENFORCEMENT PLAN, supra note 46. 
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tion of every charge.246 
I propose to redefine the EEOC's charge processing role to become an 
investigator and litigator of only significant claims. The EEOC would no 
longer intake all complaints of discrimination. Title VII would need to be 
amended to make this change.247 Shedding the charge-processing role 
will eliminate a significant set of responsibilities for the agency. It will 
not have to provide personnel to assist in filing complaints.248 It will not 
have to manage a huge volume of complaints.249 It will not have to pro-
duce and mail thousands of right-to-sue letters that currently are required 
to trigger an employee's right to bring suit in court.250 
The EEOC should focus on investigating and litigating significant 
claims. Significant claims are those claims involving novel and important 
legal issues, such as claims that have potential to develop the law. Signifi-
cant claims also include those of systemic discrimination as well as dis-
crimination that is endemic in a particular industry or field, even if only a 
single person is affected in any given workplace. This is consistent with 
the EEOC's own articulation of appropriate use of its resources.251 Fur-
thermore, the EEOC should not focus on claims where it lacks the capac-
ity to effectively investigate. Instead, the EEOC should limit the number 
of its cases so that it can provide sufficient resources to do the job prop-
erly when it elects to do SO.252 
Limiting the EEOC's litigation to significant claims is necessary for 
many of the reasons described above. In addition to these rationales, the 
reality is that the EEOC has already tried other systems, and they have 
failed. The EEOC has tried twice to investigate and litigate all meritori-
ous claims, with the result that it has become completely overwhelmed by 
the sheer numbers involved.253 Recognizing this, the EEOC has been 
moving in the direction I advocate. This process began in the mid-1990s, 
when the EEOC created a National Enforcement Plan (NEP) as well as 
246. See Moss et aI., supra note 237, at 3-4 (suggesting that employees are misled be-
cause while only a small number of charges actually receive an investigation, the adminis-
trative system suggests that all individual claims will receive one). 
247. Title VII currently establishes basic requirements to file a charge of discrimination 
and requires the EEOC to investigate all charges filed. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (2006). 
248. While this may seem to be a simple task because the charge filed with the EEOC is 
a prerequisite to sue in court, filing a charge properly is complex enough to fill 29 C.F.R 
§ 1601.6 through § 1601.14. U.S. EEOC Procedure for the Prevention of Unlawful Em-
ployment Practices, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.6-.14 (2008). 
249. In FY 2009, there were over 93,000 charges filed with the EEOC. See Charge 
Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2009, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov!eeoc!statistics!enforcementl 
charges.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
250. See U.S. EEOC Notice of Right to Sue: Procedure and Authority, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1601.28 (2008). 
251. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NATIONAL ENFORCE-
MENT PLAN, supra note 46. 
252. The EEOC was recently hit with a $4.5 million attorneys' fees award in a case 
where the court repeatedly denounced the agency for its failure to investigate the allega-
tions before filing suit. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 07-CV-95-LRR, 2010 
WL 520564, *7-8, *20 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 9, 2010). Perhaps if the agency were not over-
whelmed with the number of claims it must handle, it could have avoided this costly error. 
253. See supra Part LB. 
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Local Enforcement Plans (LEPs) for each field office.254 The NEP ar-
ticulated a litigation strategy focused on three categories of cases: (1) 
cases involving legal violations that have a potential impact beyond the 
immediate parties (but not limited to systemic discrimination); (2) cases 
with the potential to develop the law in the direction consistent with elim-
inating discrimination; and (3) cases involving the EEOC policies or prac-
tices, such as cases testing EEOC regulations or guidance.255 As is 
evident, the NEP has significant overlap with my proposal to limit EEOC 
litigation to significant claims. The goal of the LEPs was to develop a 
"strategic, focused enforcement plan."256 This effort was hampered by 
lack of coordination on both a national and local level.257 The EEOC's 
field offices appeared to differ with respect to what the focus of enforce-
ment should be.258 In addition, the LEPs were overly focused on how 
each office would manage its inventory of charges.259 
While the NEP and LEPs have moved the EEOC in the direction I 
advocate, they have not solved the EEOC's problems, and more perma-
nent structural changes are needed to effectuate long-term change. The 
current triage process for handling charges could be changed by EEOC 
management at any time. In fact, it has been changed several times over 
the course of the EEOC's existence.26o As discussed in Part I, the EEOC 
has gone back and forth over time as to how to manage its intake role, 
without success.261 It is time to change the EEOC's role permanently to 
eliminate this function. 
As to the downsides of removing the current statutory mandate that 
the EEOC accept, investigate, and conciliate all charges filed with it, the 
benefits of the charge processing system in its current state appear to be 
threefold: (1) it provides information about systemic discrimination to the 
EEOC to investigate and potentially litigate; (2) it may screen out some 
non-meritorious claims; and (3) as to charges where the parties agree to 
mediate, the EEOC has been quite successful in resolving charges. All 
these benefits can be captured without the cost of the cumbersome, com-
plex, and expensive charge management system. 
First, as discussed in Part II.BA, modern governance theory suggests 
that the EEOC should update and expand its information-gathering func-
tion.262 The data gathered can be used to determine what companies are 
254. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NATIONAL ENFORCE-
MENT PLAN, supra note 46. 
255. ld-
256. See EEOC, PRIORITY CHARGE HANDLING TASK FORCE LmGATION TASK FORCE 
REPORT (Mar. 1998), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/charge_handling.cfm (Section 
IV). 
257. [d. (Section Ill). 
258. [d. (noting the need for change so that "LEPs of all field offices, when taken as a 
whole ... set forth a comprehensive national law enforcement program"). 
259. [d. (Section V). 
260. See supra Part I.B. 
261. See supra Part I. 
262. See supra Part II.B.4. 
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investigated for potential systemic discrimination. In addition to this 
source of information, the EEOC could also establish an online and/or 
phone-operated system to allow those with information about systemic 
discrimination to report it. Rather than being legally obligated to sift 
through tens of thousands of charges and categorize each one, the EEOC 
would be able to self-select the complaints it investigates and direct its 
attention to areas that are most important. 
Second, the benefit of screening out nonmeritorious cases is questiona-
ble at best. This is because the EEOC cannot bar a plaintiff from seeking 
redress through the courts; all it can do is issue a right-to-sue letter and 
inform the plaintiff that the EEOC does not believe that there is a 
claim.263 Employees are still free to sue in federal court if they wish.264 
Furthermore, this role of telling employees that they lack a viable claim 
will end up being filled by private attorneys in the absence of the EEOC. 
Because these claims are taken on a contingency basis, plaintiffs' lawyers 
are incentivized to screen out nonmeritorious claims and refuse to take 
them. Employees will still be able to bring suit in federal court, but the 
number of those who will seems unlikely to be much different whether a 
plaintiff's lawyer, an EEOC employee, or no one (as is frequently the 
case now for claims that do not get investigated) tells them that they do 
not have a viable claim. 
Third, the EEOC's mediation role will be preserved in a slightly differ-
ent form, as discussed in Part II.B.3, maintaining this effective program. 
2. Proposal Two: Promote Effective Self-Regulation by Developing 
Model Policies and Conducting Training and Outreach 
With significant resources made available by eliminating charge 
processing, the question inevitably becomes how those resources should 
be allocated. The EEOC should use these resources to assist employers 
in creating effective self-regulatory regimes. Thus, the second component 
to the restructured EEOC is the development of a large section of the 
agency devoted to (1) providing information and (2) conducting outreach 
and training for employers. 
The rise of self-regulation as an integral part of the administrative en-
forcement of employee rights is evident.265 It is one of the hallmark fea-
tures of modern governance theories.266 But a crucial concern that arises 
in self-regulatory systems is the need to ensure that the self-regulation is 
effective.267 There are two components to this. First, the employer has to 
adopt appropriate policies and practices.268 Second, there needs to be 
263. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5 (2006). 
264. [d. 
265. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 77-78 (2010). 
266. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 206, at 131-32. 
267. See ESTLUND, supra note 265, at 99 (noting that Wal-Mart had adopted policies 
and practices that indicated compliance with legal standards but failed to enforce them). 
268. See id. at 75-104 (providing examples of employer-created policies and practices to 
comply with workplace laws). 
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some mechanism to provide oversight.269 
In the area of employment discrimination, Professor Estlund has pos-
ited that a system of enforced self-regulation, which she refers to as co-
regulation, currently exists.27o Employers are encouraged to self-regulate 
and to create antidiscrimination policies and practices because of Su-
preme Court cases that have created defenses to discrimination claims for 
employers who have such policies and practices.271 Employers' self-regu-
lation is overseen by the courts, as the employers' policies and procedures 
must be effective in order for the defense to be applicable.272 
The EEOC should become an active participant in the enforced self-
regulation of employers. The EEOC can become an effective participant 
by assisting employers in developing policies and procedures that are the 
heart of employer self-regulation. In addition, where self-regulation fails, 
the EEOC must be enabled to become a more powerful force in 
enforcement. 
The EEOC already provides some assistance to employers in the devel-
opment and implementation of effective antidiscrimination policies and 
procedures, but this is insufficient. At present, the EEOC does not offer 
to employers examples of good personnel policies and practices that are 
consistent with federal antidiscrimination laws and promote the EEOC's 
goal of eradicating employment discrimination.273 The EEOC should 
provide examples of sound employer policies and practices.274 I envision 
the EEOC providing several types of information in this category. First, 
and most basic, the EEOC should develop a sample equal employment 
opportunity policy. While the EEOC has posters covering the basics of 
federal antidiscrimination laws,275 this effort should be expanded. Most 
mid-sized and large employers have employee handbooks. Employees 
are encouraged or, in some instances, required to read these handbooks. 
Employers do not require or encourage employees to read the posters 
269. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 206, at 104-06 (advocating having a cor-
porate compliance officer who would be responsible for reporting violations to the govern-
ment); ESTLUND, supra note 265, at 75-130 (identifying different manners of enforcing the 
self-regulation). 
270. See ESTLUND, supra note 265, at 83-88. 
271. See id. at 86-87 (discussing the effects of Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 
(1998), Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Kolstad v. Am. Dental 
Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)). 
272. See id. at 88. Professor EstIund acknowledges that it is not yet clear whether this 
oversight is effective, as courts could cursorily assess the employer's policies and practices. 
273. The EEOC website offers limited guidance to employers on what constitutes pro-
hibited discrimination: that is, what cannot be done. It does not, however, provide specific 
positive guidance on what employers should be doing. See, e.g., Policy Guidance Docu-
ments Related to Age Discrimination, EEOC, http://eeoc.govllawsltypes/age~uidance.cfm 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (providing general policy guidance on age discrimination in 
employment but failing to provide model policies or practices for employers). 
274. I am not the only former employer representative to note that the EEOC needs to 
provide greater assistance to employers in order to assist them in complying with the law. 
Former Commissioner Reginald Jones has also noted this need. See Jones, supra note 140, 
at 320. 
275. See Publications Request Form, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
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that line the walls of break rooms. It would be fairly easy for the EEOC 
to develop sample equal employment opportunity policies. This type of 
policy was one of the very first policies that I, as an attorney in private 
practice, advised clients to include in their handbook. Not all employers 
have attorneys to advise them to do so, and even if there is a human 
resources officer, it is not certain that person will have the expertise to 
draft such a policy. It was my experience that many policies seemed to be 
e-mailed from company to company. Some were good; others were not. 
The EEOC could make immediate change by providing a sample policy 
on its website that employers could at least use as a good basis for their 
own policy. Other federal agencies provide this type of assistance: for 
instance, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
provides many sample policies to employers.276 
Second, the EEOC should develop frequently asked questions (FAQs) 
for employers to address common scenarios employers face277 and pro-
vide guidance on how employers should handle such scenarios.278 For 
instance, there is a body of research indicating that applicants with non-
white-sounding names are less likely to receive an interview than appli-
cants with white-sounding names.279 The EEOC could explain different 
ways that employers could avoid this type of bias in a FAQ section de-
voted to hiring. Other common hiring issues include such problems as 
employers not knowing what questions to ask and what questions they 
should not ask of applicants. 
While the EEOC has provided guidance on this topic, the guidance is 
not in a location or format helpful to employers. For instance, the EEOC 
website provides an overview of what is illegal for employers to do.280 
The page is overwhelming and poorly organized. It starts with an expla-
nation of what is illegal in the hiring process, moves into unlawful behav-
276. See, e.g., Hazard Communication HAZCOM Programs, OSHA, http://www.osha. 
gov/dsglhazcomlsolutions.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (providing sample Hazard Com-
munication Plan for bloodborne pathogens). 
277. The EEOC has developed some FAQs. However, the FAQs are focused on very 
specific types of discrimination and are for the benefit of employees. See, e.g., Youth at 
Work Religious Discrimination-FAQs, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/youth/religion2.html 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
278. The EEOC did focus on developing an understanding and providing examples of 
employer "best practices" in the 1990s. However, the results of the EEOC's work, includ-
ing examples of employers' practices that promote diversity in the workplace and prevent 
discrimination, are not included directly on its website. Instead, they are located in a task 
force report (which can be obtained on the website, but is difficult to locate, and the mate-
rial is not presented in a readily-usable format). See Best Practices of Private Sector Em-
ployers, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeocltask_reportslbescpractices.cfm (last visited Oct. 
21, 2010). The results are also available in a law review article written by a Commissioner. 
See generally Jones, supra note 140 (describing the EEOC's work and providing concrete 
examples of best practices). In addition, the EEOC decided to use the results in its 
presentations. See id. at 337. 
279. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 
94 AM. EeoN. REV. 991, 1011 (2004). 
280. See Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/laws/prac-
tices/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
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ior in the terms and conditions of employment, and then discusses 
discharge and discipline. After that, it goes back to terms and conditions 
with a focus on harassment and then moves to pre-employment question-
ing. There appears to be no rational organizational effort. Furthermore, 
the content is extremely limited, with much of the substance stating repet-
itively that it is illegal to discriminate. There appears to have been no 
attempt to provide specific examples of lawful versus unlawful con-
dUCt.281 Employers are forced to resort to paying attorneys for answers 
to basic questions because the EEOC has failed to provide this informa-
tion to the public in a useful manner.282 
Beyond such basic information, the EEOC can also promote diversity 
in employment by providing accessible, useful guidance on employer best 
practices. Identifying these best practices is something the EEOC has 
done in the past and could replicate at present. For instance, in 1997, the 
EEOC created a task force devoted to defining and identifying such best 
practices in employment.283 The task force released a report on these 
best practices.284 The failure on the part of the EEOC was not the work 
it did285 but instead what it did with that work-it failed to proactively 
disseminate the information in the report to employers to enable them to 
change workplace policies and procedures.286 The next step, taking the 
information obtained and converting it into useful material for employ-
ers, is essential to the success of any EEOC program to decrease employ-
ment discrimination in the workplace. More recently, the EEOC did 
create a "Best Practices" webpage focusing on preventing discrimination 
against those persons who have care giving (family) responsibilities.287 
The information on the page is helpful and understandable. However, 
the page is buried in the EEOC website and is extremely difficult to 10-
cate.288 The lack of readily-available positive examples of best practices 
281. See id. 
282. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form From Substance: Understanding Em-
ployer Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMP. RTs. & EMP'T POL'y J. 1, 14-34 (1999) (dis-
cussing the extent to which employers rely upon lawyers to advise them on complying with 
antidiscrimination laws). 
283. See Press Release, U.S. EEOC, Commission Releases Task Force Report on 
"Best" Private Sector EEO Efforts (Dec. 22, 1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/ 
release/12-22-97.cfm. 
284. See id. 
285. The report is quite detailed and contains useful information about the concept of 
best practices, as well as specific examples of what employers have been doing that have 
proven to be effective. See Best Practices of Private Sector Employees, supra note 278. 
286. It is not clear what the EEOC did with the report, other than posting it on its 
website, and issuing a press release, but it could not have done very much to publicize it. 
In the years immediately following the EEOC's release of the task force report, I assisted 
employers in designing, modifying, and conducting litigation involving their employment 
policies. Despite being active in the area and attending conferences focusing on employ-
ment discrimination laws, I do not recall knowing about it until I began researching this 
Article. 
287. See Employer Best Practices for Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, EEOC, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
288. It is not listed among the materials listed to assist employers. It can be found if 
one knows it exists by doing a search of the website using "best practices"; however, this is 
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may be contributing to the development of a defensive strategy by em-
ployers to limit the viability of discrimination claims. Without best prac-
tices, employers turn to defensive strategies to deter employment 
discrimination claims.289 
Providing these types of information to employers would make the 
EEOC more of a partner with employers, in preventing discrimination, 
rather than only being seen by employers as an employee-advocating 
agency. However, merely providing information is only the first step in 
expanding its partnership with employers. I also propose that the EEOC 
should greatly expand its employer-training program. As discussed in 
Part I.E., the EEOC is currently authorized to have a fee-based training 
program.290 This program is tiny.291 The program should be greatly ex-
panded and fees should be significantly reduced. The program should be 
expanded to create a group of full-time attorneys who oversee a staff of 
employees that conduct training programs nationwide. The first targeted 
audience should be smaller employers covered by the federal antidis-
crimination laws. Large employers should be a lesser concern, simply be-
cause of the reality that many larger employers do have sufficient 
resources to obtain counsel from private attorneys to comply with federal 
antidiscrimination laws.292 Smaller employers lack the finances to pay for 
private attorneys and also frequently lack a human resources 
department.293 
These training programs should have three components: (1) educating 
attendees on federal antidiscrimination laws; (2) training attendees to 
present information at their own workplaces; and (3) offering open ques-
tion and answer sessions. Through these training programs, the EEOC 
will gain valuable insight into the kinds of problems that employers are 
handling on a day-to-day basis, which can be used to shape future training 
programs as well as the FAQs that the EEOC puts on its website. 
As experience presenting at several such training programs in the pri-
vate sector (provided by large law firms) makes clear, when the training is 
of little use to an employer who is browsing the website looking for guidance on complying 
with the antidiscrimination laws. 
289. See generally Bisom-Rapp, supra note 282, at 3 (describing the increasing use of 
defensive strategies by employers and positing that such strategies may conceal 
discrimination ). 
290. See supra Part I.E. 
291. See supra Part I.E.2; 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7. 
292. Bisom-Rapp, supra note 282, at 14-16. 
293. The EEOC recognizes this fact. Its website informs small businesses that if they 
have questions not answered on the website, they can contact a small business liaison. See 
Employers, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/employers/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 10,2010). How-
ever, there are only fifty such liaisons nationwide. See Small Business Liaisons, EEOC, 
http://eeoc.gov/employers/contacts.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). Given that, as of 2006, 
there were more than five million businesses in the U.S. with fewer than twenty employees, 
each liaison would be responsible for approximately 100,000 businesses. See Statistics of 
u.s. Businesses, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2007), http;llwww.census.gov/econlsusb/ (providing 
the most recent data on small businesses in the United States). It is doubtful that these 
liaisons can effectively assist a significant number of the businesses for which they are 
responsible. 
1270 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
free, there is no lack of attendees. At the outset, these training programs 
should be conducted free of charge to get the word out that they are 
valuable and useful. After the programs become accepted and space be-
comes limited, the EEOC should impose charges on employers, using a 
sliding scale based on an employer's size. 
Another possible means for the EEOC to assist employers is to provide 
hands-on assistance. Using its data from the EEO-1 surveys, the EEOC 
can identify workplaces that do not have a workforce that mirrors the 
available labor pool.294 These employers can be contacted and notified of 
the discrepancy. The EEOC can provide its suggested policies and prac-
tices for improving workplace diversity to these employers. It can also 
offer personalized assistance. This type of assistance, having the potential 
to be very labor-intensive, and thus expensive, should be directed toward 
specific industries that the EEOC is targeting to improve labor participa-
tion rates of underrepresented groups.295 
Combining information-providing and training directed at those with 
the ability to prevent discrimination from occurring-employers-will re-
sult in increased compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws in a 
more effective manner than the current EEOC approach, which is prima-
rily reactive in nature. It will decrease the need for costly litigation to 
deter discrimination and help ensure that the EEOC is not operating in 
an information vacuum when it comes to employer concerns. 
3. Proposal Three: Increase EEOC Enforcement Powers 
Turning to the enforcement and oversight component of self-regula-
tion, as noted in Part I, supra, the EEOC has always had limited enforce-
ment authority.296 To ensure effective self-regulation, the EEOC needs 
to have sufficient clout to be able to spur recalcitrant employers to com-
ply with the law. 
In order to obtain employer cooperation and ensure effective self-regu-
lation, the EEOC needs to engender greater fear in employers of EEOC 
litigation. The EEOC has no real powers it can use against employers 
other than its limited subpoena power297 and the ability to litigate 
cases.298 Employers already face the threat of document production re-
quests (akin to the subpoena power) and the overall threat of litigation 
294. This mirrors what the Occupational Safety and Health Administration recently did 
when it notified employers who had high levels of workplace injuries of their high levels, 
made suggestions for preventing injuries, and offered assistance to any employer who was 
interested. See News Release, OSHA, U.S. Labor Department's OSHA Notifies 15,000 
Workplaces Nationwide of High Injury and Illness Rates (Mar. 9, 2010), http://osha.gov/ 
pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=17238. 
295. OSHA maintains a policy of providing compliance assistance to any employer who 
requests it, but it gives priority to small employers in industries where workplace hazards 
are particularly high. See OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL 2-2 (2009), http:// 
osha.gov/OshDoclDirective_pdflCPL_02-00-148.pdf. 
296. See 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(b)-(d) (2006). 
297. See id. § 2000e-9; 29 U.S.c. § 161 (2006). 
298. See § 2000e-5 (establishing enforcement powers of the EEOC). 
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from private sector attorneys;299 EEOC litigation is no worse than litiga-
tion from private sector attorneys for reasons discussed below. This 
means that the EEOC has no significant leverage against employers to 
ensure cooperation. 
In addition to its current authority to subpoena records and litigate 
cases, the restructured EEOC needs to have the authority (1) to investi-
gate employer policies and practices to determine whether there is unlaw-
ful discrimination present and (2) to obtain attorneys' fees and fines 
against employers who engage in unlawful discrimination. 
As to the first point, the EEOC already has some investigative author-
ity.300 It can issue subpoenas seeking information relevant to a charge 
filed with the agency.301 However, this subpoena power is limited to ob-
taining information regarding existing charges of discrimination; the 
EEOC lacks the power to issue subpoenas absent such a charge.302 Thus, 
unlike OSHA,303 the EEOC is unable to proactively investigate.304 This 
limits the EEOC's ability to control its own enforcement efforts.305 By 
contrast, OSHA has developed its own priority system for enforcing fed-
eral workplace safety laws.306 The EEOC can only react and select 
among existing charges to investigate.307 While there may at times be 
charges that correspond with the EEOC's desired enforcement efforts, 
there is no guarantee that this is reality. 
This limited investigative power also means that employers who do not 
have charges pending against them are insulated from EEOC investiga-
tion.308 While some such employers may not need to be investigated, as 
the lack of charges indicates a lack of unlawful discrimination, this is not 
necessarily true of all employers.309 Some employers may not have 
charges brought against them despite engaging in unlawful discrimina-
tion.310 For instance, an employer with a workforce that contains work-
ers who lack knowledge of their rights (the classic example being 
undocumented workers) may have no charges pending due to the lack of 
299. See 42 U.S.c. § 1981(a) (2006). 
300. See § 2000e-5. 
301. See § 161; § 2000e-9; EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 65 (1984) (holding that a 
charge is a "jurisdictional prerequisite" for an EEOC-issued subpoena). 
302. See § 161; § 2000e-9; Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 65. 
303. See OSHA Authority for Inspection, 29 C.F.R. § 1903.3(a) (2010) (compliance of-
ficer entitled to inspect during reasonable working hours; no requirement of a complaint 
being filed). 
304. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 64-65. 
305. [d. 
306. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA INSPECTIONS 3 (2002), http://www.osha.gov/ 
Publications/osha2098.pdf (describing OSHA's priorities in conducting inspections). 
307. See Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 64-65. 
308. They are not entirely insulated, as commissioners have the authority to bring a 
charge. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (2006). 
309. See generally Bisom-Rapp, supra note 282, at 3 (describing the increasing use of 
defensive strategies by employers and positing that such strategies may conceal 
discrimination). 
310. [d. 
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knowledge or fear of reporting discrimination.311 Thus, employers may 
have facially discriminatory policies that are never revealed and changed. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, because I am advocating that the 
entire charge processing system be dismantled, the EEOC's investigative 
powers need to be decoupled from that charge processing system. In lieu 
of investigations that are reactive and limited to existing charges, I pro-
pose that Title VII be amended to allow the EEOC to undertake investi-
gations where (1) a complaint has been filed with a court or (2) there is a 
reasonable basis to believe that a violation of federal employment dis-
crimination laws has occurred. This expands the EEOC's authority in a 
limited way to allow it to focus on situations where a person may not feel 
able to file a claim.312 
Where a complaint has been filed with a court, the EEOC still needs to 
be able to investigate to determine whether the individual claim might, in 
fact, prove to implicate more employees than the individual bringing suit. 
A single employee may challenge an employer's practice that can affect 
thousands of employees.313 The EEOC needs to be able to investigate 
and, if necessary, bring suit on behalf of affected individuals who have 
not yet sued. 
In addition to investigation in response to a court-filed complaint, the 
EEOC also needs to be able to investigate when it has a reasonable basis 
to believe that the federal antidiscrimination laws have been violated in 
order to uncover discrimination where employees are unwilling or unable 
to file a claim in federal court. The EEOC may obtain information from 
the EEO-1 forms314 that may indicate unlawful discrimination is occur-
ring.315 It may also receive information from employees, via the online or 
phone complaint line, who have not filed suit, as discussed above, that 
indicates unlawful discrimination. The EEOC should be empowered to 
investigate these situations to determine whether it should bring suit on 
its own. This type of investigative authority is similar to the investigative 
authority of OSHA. OSHA conducts programmed (planned) inspections 
of workplaces based on OSHA's determination of the degree of hazards 
311. For a discussion of some of the impediments to these workers filing charges of 
discrimination, see Gleeson, supra note 160, at 669-75. 
312. At present, the EEOC has a limited ability to investigate without an individual 
filing a charge of discrimination. Commissioners may file charges, and then the EEOC is 
able to investigate. See § 2000e-5. However, Commissioner's charges are very rare, as is to 
be expected when the authority lies with the most senior official in the Agency. LESLIE E. 
SILVERMAN, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REpORT TO THE CHAIR OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 10 (Mar. 2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/uploadl 
systemic. pdf. My recommendation would expand this system so no such charge would be 
needed; all the EEOC would need is reasonable grounds to believe federal antidiscrimina-
tion laws have been violated. 
313. For instance, the EEOC is currently investigating UPS's policy of prohibiting facial 
hair for employees who have contact with the public. Two individuals, in separate cases, 
challenged the policy. The EEOC is seeking information that might lead to a class action 
lawsuit. See EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 136, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2009). 
314. See discussion infra Part II.B.5. 
315. ££0-1 Form, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeol/eeol_2007_d.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
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in the workplaces.316 While the EEOC is focused on less-tangible 
hazards in the workplace, the same concepts can be used to develop its 
investigative priorities. 
In either of these scenarios, once the EEOC has investigated, if it de-
termines that bringing suit is appropriate, it should be able to do so. The 
EEOC currently has this authority,317 so no structural change is necessary 
as to the right to bring suit. 
However, the current threat of EEOC litigation is insufficient. The 
power that the EEOC needs to add to its arsenal is the power to obtain 
attorneys' fees and penalties from employers who engage in unlawful dis-
crimination. At present, the EEOC has the power to obtain remedies for 
victims of discrimination.318 These remedies are identical to the remedies 
available to victims of discrimination in lawsuits brought by private attor-
neys.319 Thus, the EEOC's threat of litigation is not likely to be of con-
cern to an employer. In fact, an employer may be less likely to fear the 
EEOC litigation units because they are unable to recover attorneys' 
fees,320 which is a significant cost imposed on employers who lose in 
claims involving private attorneys.321 In addition, the data on amounts of 
recovery indicate that private attorneys recover more money for their cli-
ents than the EEOC does.322 In sum, the EEOC's threat is of litigation 
that costs less than litigation by a private sector attorney. 
This situation needs to be reversed. I propose that Title VII be 
amended as follows. First, the provision on attorneys' fees323 should be 
revised to affirmatively allow the EEOC to recover attorneys' fees. 
There is precedent for government attorneys to recover attorneys' fees.324 
Attorneys' fees have been recovered by the Environmental Protection 
Agency for government lawyers working on violations of federal environ-
mental laws.325 
Because attorneys' fees are already available to private attorneys rep-
resenting victims of discrimination,326 merely adding the EEOC's attor-
neys' fees onto the recovery will not create the necessary effect. More is 
needed. One obvious option is to restructure the EEOC to give it the 
power to determine whether discrimination has occurred at the adminis-
316. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 306, at 3-4 (discussing priorities for con-
ducting programmed inspections). 
317. See § 2000e-5. 
318. [d. 
319. See 42 U.S.c. § 1981(a) (2006). 
320. § 2000e-5(k) (prohibiting the EEOC from recovering attorney's fees). 
321. § 2000e-5. 
322. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 23. 
323. § 2000e-5(k). 
324. See United States v. Dico, Inc., 266 F. 3d 864, 876-78 (8th Cir. 2001); United States 
v. Chapman, 146 F.3d 1166, 1175-77 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 
1199-1200 (8th Cir. 1994). 
325. [d. 
326. § 2000e-5. 
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trative level and to order appropriate relief.327 This would make the 
EEOC more like other administrative agencies, such as OSHA,328 and 
obviously increase the EEOC's enforcement powers but at a high cost. 
However, as one of the main problems noted above is the volume of 
claims the EEOC must manage at present, adding an investigative/hear-
ing component to the EEOC seems imprudent given the EEOC's inabil-
ity to manage its current responsibilities. This leads me to propose a 
different solution. In litigation by the EEOC, in addition to the remedies 
available to the plaintiff, provision should be made for civil fines to be 
levied against the employer, payable to the EEOC. Civil fines are found 
in other areas of employment law, such as for violations of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act,329 hiring unauthorized workers under the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986,330 and violating the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act.331 Fines and attorneys' fees together would give 
the EEOC greater clout when it litigates employment discrimination 
claims. 
4. Proposal Four: Partnering with the Federal Courts 
The fourth aspect to the restructuring of the EEOC is the development 
of a partnership with the federal courts to implement a unique mediation 
system. This partnership would be one whereby the EEOC provides me-
diation services in employment discrimination cases.332 Under the new 
structure of the EEOC, the mediation program would become an option 
upon a party filing suit in federal court. Once a complaint is filed, each 
party would receive a standard letter informing them of the mediation 
option with the EEOC.333 Both parties would need to opt into the medi-
ation session. Having the EEOC provide mediation services would also 
help mitigate the impact of the potential increase in the number of em-
ployment claims that would need to be adjudicated by the federal courts. 
There are also substantive reasons for the EEOC to maintain its media-
tion role. First, retention of that role would allow the EEOC to still en-
gage in conciliation efforts, which are a part of its mandate under Title 
327. This approach was discussed in the 1980s as the federal courts experienced a signif-
icant increase in the number of employment discrimination claims. However, even at that 
time, the EEOC doubted its ability to undertake this role. See Lynch, supra note 97, at 
103. 
328. See 29 V.S.c. §§ 657-60 (2006) (granting OSHA the authority to investigate and 
issue citations for violations of the Occupational Health and Safety Act and establishing 
administrative procedure within OSHA for employers to challenge the citations). 
329. [d. § 216(a), (e) (2006). 
330. 8 V.S.c. § 1324a (2006). 
331. 29 V.S.c. § 666(a)-(c) (2006). 
332. The EEOC once suggested that the federal courts should consider greater use of 
ADR in employment discrimination cases. See Lynch, supra note 97, at 103. My proposal 
would bring together the benefits of ADR with the expertise of the EEOC in discrimina-
tion claims to benefit parties, the courts, and the EEOC. 
333. This is very similar to the current process at the EEOC. Once a charge is identi-
fied as a candidate for mediation, the parties receive an invitation to mediate. Both parties 
must agree for the mediation to take place. See Facts About Mediation, EEOC, http:// 
eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/facts.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
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VIJ.334 With the demise of its charge-processing role, the EEOC's concil-
iation efforts would be very limited without the mediation partnership. 
Second, the mediation program has been highly successful. The media-
tion program is significant in scope, with more than 12,000 mediations 
conducted in FY 2008.335 This number represents approximately 12% of 
all charges received.336 Participants report positively on the experience, 
with 96% of employers and 91 % of employees who used it indicating that 
they would use it again.337 More than 90% of employers who elect not to 
use the EEOC's mediation services cite the most important reason for 
this decision as being unrelated to the EEOC mediation program; in-
stead, the reason is the employer's perception that the case lacks merit.338 
The success rate for the EEOC's mediation program is also quite positive, 
with more than 70% of all mediations resolving the claim.339 
A third reason to create an EEOC partnership with the federal courts 
under which the EEOC would provide mediation services is pragmatic in 
nature. If there is an expansion of claims filed in the federal courts due to 
the termination of the EEOC's charge-intake program, this mediation 
partnership can help offset the increased load. 
Governance theory supports this partnership with the federal courts, 
based on the idea that cross-governmental collaboration may more fully 
address problems than anyone federal agency can.340 While the focus of 
governance theory is on collaboration by different agencies to provide 
responses more holistically,341 the theory supports the use of non-tradi-
tional approaches to reach a better result for all parties.342 Given the 
strongly positive results that the EEOC has been achieving with its medi-
ation program and the ongoing push toward moving cases from litigation 
into ADR,343 this partnership has great promise. 
5. Proposal Five: Information Gathering and Analysis 
The fifth aspect to the EEOC's revised structure is an expanded pro-
gram focusing on obtaining detailed statistical information about the na-
334. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). 
335. See EEOC Mediation Statistics FY 1999 through FY 2008, EEOC, http://www.eeoc. 
gov/eeoc!mediationlmediation_stats.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
336. The EEOC received 95,402 private sector charges in FY 2008. See 2008 REPORT, 
supra note 58. 
337. See Facts About Mediation, supra note 333. 
338. See E. Patrick McDermott et al., An Investigation of the Reasons for the Lack of 
Employer Participation in the EEOC Mediation Program, EEOC, http://archive.eeoc.gov/ 
mediate/study3/chapter4.html (last modified Dec. 2, 2003). 
339. This percentage reflects the success rate beginning with FY 2005. The mediation 
success rate rose steadily from 65% to 70% from FY 1999 to FY 2004; since FY 2006 it has 
remained essentially flat at 72%. See EEOC Mediation Statistics FY 1999 through FY 2008, 
supra note 335. 
340. See Lobel, supra note 196, at 385-88. 
341. Id. 
342. See generally id. at 388. 
343. See Jones, supra note 140, at 320-323 (former Commissioner of the EEOC noting 
the need to increase the use of ADR and congressional agreement to increase the EEOC's 
budget to allow for greater use of it). 
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tion's workforce. The EEOC has not required any particular records or 
form of recordkeeping of employers under Title VII despite its statutory 
authority to do SO.344 At present, the EEOC only requires information 
from large employers-those with at least 100 employees and those with 
at least 50 employees who are government contractors.345 These employ-
ers must provide an annual EEO-1 report.346 For each type of position, 
which includes categories such as professional, sales, service workers, ad-
ministrative support workers, the employer must identify the number of 
employees by race, ethnicity and sex.347 
The EEOC should focus on this information-gathering power to allow 
it to identify indications of systemic discrimination in the workforce. The 
EEO-1 has been used for this purpose in the past.348 However, the infor-
mation obtained is limited, and, when the form was most recently revised, 
the information required was not expanded but limited.349 
The need for good information is essential to the EEOC's operations. 
It is especially important in light of my recommendation that the EEOC 
no longer accept charges of discrimination. The EEOC will need to rely 
on information generated in these reports in order to identify situations 
where systemic discrimination may be occurring. Given the ease with 
which information can be obtained, compiled, and submitted, information 
should also be gathered from smaller employers so that all employers 
covered by Title VII provide at least the basic EEO-1 data. 
In addition, the type of information obtained should be expanded be-
yond the current basics of number of employees by race, ethnicity, and 
sex in each job category. The next most-obvious area of information to 
include would be employee terminations as well. Other possibilities in-
344. See EEOC Records to Be Made or Kept, 42 C.F.R. § 1602.12 (2010) (noting that 
the EEOC does not require particularized records or recordkeeping); 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-
8(c) (2006) (requiring that "[e]very employer, employment agency, and labor organization 
subject to this subchapter shall (1) make and keep such records relevant to the determina-
tions of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being committed, (2) 
preserve such records for such periods, and (3) make such reports therefrom as the Com-
mission shall prescribe by regulation or order, after public hearing, as reasonable, neces-
sary, or appropriate for the enforcement of this subchapter or the regulations or orders 
thereunder. ") 
345. EEOC Requirement for Filing of Report, 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2010). 
346. See id. Unions file an annual EEO-3 report and state governments file an EEO-4 
report; all reports require similar information. 
347. The annual EEO report was held to be constitutional and a lawful exercise of 
delegated authority by the EEOC in United States v. State of New Hampshire, 539 F.2d 
277, 280 (1st Cir. 1976). While that case addressed the validity of the EEO-4 report, the 
rationale behind it would encompass the EEO-1 as well. For the sample, blank EEO-l 
report, see ££0-1 Form, supra note 315. While the EEO-l clearly seeks sex and race 
information, it is limited in the information on ethnicity and national origin. Employees 
have to be categorized as one of the following: White, Hispanic, Black, Asian, Native 
American, HawaiianfPacific Islander, or multi-racial. 
348. See Commissioner Stuart J. Ishimaru, Remarks at the Meeting on Operations in 
Wake of Hurricane Katrina Revisions to EEO-l Report (Nov. 16,2005), available at http:// 
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/archive/1l-16-05/ishimaru.html (noting the use of the data by 
the EEOC and, at times, by the U.S. Department of Justice). 
349. See id. at 2 (commenting on the use of the "two or more" race category in the new 
form). 
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clude (1) data on salaries by race and sex and (2) data on applicants by 
race and sex. Here, in the rule-promulgation situation, is the opportunity 
to draw upon governance theory to improve over the traditional regula-
tor models of producing regulations. Collaborative efforts in rulemaking 
are the touchstone. This would entail the EEOC engaging all parties-
the public, employers, employees, and discrimination law experts-to be-
gin a dialogue on what information would best enable the EEOC to iden-
tify and assist employers in eradicating discrimination without being 
unduly burdensome on employers, particularly small companies. 
Governance theory also suggests that this situation may be one where 
flexibility is warranted. Rather than engaging in the typical one-size-fits-
all approach, flexibility in application should be given consideration, al-
lowing different information to be provided by different types and loca-
tions of employers.35o It may be more effective for the EEOC to obtain 
different types of information from different employers about different 
types of jobs as the types of systemic discrimination vary greatly by indus-
try and also by job type. This area is also one in which enforced self-
regulation may be appropriate, where the nation's largest employers, 
faced with the potential for the EEOC to mandate significantly greater 
information flow from private-sector employers, voluntarily agree to pro-
vide substantial information.351 
III. CONCLUSION 
The EEOC has long been criticized about its operations. In order for it 
to become an effective agency in the struggle against employment dis-
crimination, the EEOC needs to undergo significant structural changes. 
By eliminating the extremely expensive and nearly useless function of 
charge processing, significant resources can be devoted to more effective 
efforts in combating employment discrimination. Providing meaningful 
assistance in developing employer policies and practices will decrease dis-
crimination that charge processing never could. Ferreting out hidden dis-
crimination will be helped by increasing the EEOC's information 
gathering abilities and requiring employers to provide more data on em-
ployees to the agency. And where discrimination exists because preven-
tion fails, primary responsibility for enforcing the laws needs to reside 
with the multitude of private attorneys general. Providing greater access 
to mediation in the court process will assist in reducing the burden on the 
federal courts. This is not to say that the EEOC should retain no role in 
the litigation arena. For significant claims, the EEOC should be involved 
in litigation, and, to increase its effectiveness, the EEOC needs to be able 
to use increased threats of sanctions that will help it persuade wayward 
employers to engage with the agency in remediating unlawful 
discrimination. 
350. See Lobel, supra note 196, at 379-80. 
351. See id. at 388-92. 
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